Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, Provo College, Mosese Iongi, Trevor Smith, Wallace Rogers, Richard Horwitz, Steven Todd Knecht, and Jana Miller : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College,
Provo College, Mosese Iongi, Trevor Smith,
Wallace Rogers, Richard Horwitz, Steven Todd
Knecht, and Jana Miller : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Jennifer R. Eshelman; Anderson and Karrenberg; Nathan B. Wilcox; Clyde
Snow Sessions and Swenson; Attorneys for Appellees.
Robert E. Mansfield, Troy L. Booher; Snell and Wilmer LLP; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, No. 20090815 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1917
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO 
COLLEGE, MOSESEIONGI, 
TREVOR SMITH, WALLACE 
ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT, and JANA 
MILLER, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20090815 
Appeal from the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable 
Robert Faust 
District Court No. 040921860 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, 
PROVO COLLEGE AND JANA MILLER 
SNELL & WILMER 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Troy L. Booher 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Stevens-Henager College 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2035 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
201 S. Main Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College and 
Jana Miller 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 2 2 2010 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO 
COLLEGE, MOSESEIONGI, 
TREVOR SMITH, WALLACE 
ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT, and JANA 
MILLER, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Troy L. Booher 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Stevens-Henager College 
Case No. 20090815 
Appeal from the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable 
Robert Faust 
District Court No. 040921860 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
201 S. Main Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College and 
Jana Miller 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, 
PROVO COLLEGE AND JANA MILLER 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
I. Nature of the case 7 
II. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 9 
A. Plaintiff s Complaint 9 
B. Scheduling Orders and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 11 
C. The First Motion for Summary Judgment 14 
D. Plaintiffs Motion for Relief From or For Reconsideration of the 
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment 17 
E. The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion to Strike the Preliminary Expert 
Report ofBradTownsend 18 
F. The Eagle Gate Parties' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 19 
G. The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion in Limine 20 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20 
ARGUMENT 22 
I. The Trial Court Properly Granted the First Motion for Summary Judgment 22 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Substantiate Its Damages Through Timely 
Expert Testimony 23 
B. Plaintiff Failed to Present Evidence of the Fact of Damages 
Through Non-Expert Testimony 26 
i 
Carol Gastiger's Testimony 30 
Vicki Dewsnup's Testimony 33 
Carl Barney's Testimony 36 
II. The Court Correctly Ordered Plaintiffs Belated Expert Report to be 
Stricken and Was Well Within Its Discretion to Refuse to Allow It 38 
III. Regardless of Its Decision on Summary Judgment, the Trial Court 
Correctly Excluded Evidence of Damages 43 
IV. The Court Properly Granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
On Plaintiffs CFAA Claim 43 
CONCLUSION 45 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 46 
ADDENDUM OF EXHIBITS 47 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 29-30 
Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 215 P.3d 933 2 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 32, 36 
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 63 P.3d 686 4 
Kibatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Utah 2001) 35, 37 
Lee v. Langlev, 2005 UT App 339, 531 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 4 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175, 982 P.2d 586 42 
McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 42 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382, 174 P.3d 1 (rev'd on the 
Grounds, 2009 UT 44, 215 P.3d 152) 4 
Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, 222 P.3d 775 2, 24-25, 39 
Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App 356, 101 P.3d 383 ....28-29 
Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk School Dist, 147 P.3d 720, 727 (Alaska 2006) 24 
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Center, 2007 UT App 235, 166 P.3d 614 27-28 
Truegreen Co., L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 199 P.3d 929, 934 (Utah 2008) 34-35 
Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, 184 P.3d 578 1-2 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-4-103(2)(a) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-A-4-103(2)(j) 1 
i i i 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37 5, 39 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) 39 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) 39 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) 39 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) 39 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(b)(2003) 6,43 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (2003) 6, 43 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a), 
103(2)0. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs claims for damages against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and 
Jana Miller (collectively "the Eagle Gate Parties") where Plaintiff failed to produce 
evidence to substantiate its damages. 
This issue turns on whether Plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff could present any evidence that it 
suffered damages as a result of the alleged actions of the Eagle Gate Parties. 
Standard of Review 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., W. Water, LLC 
v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, f 14, 184 P.3d 578. 
Issue No. 2 
2. Whether the trial court correctly ordered that Plaintiffs untimely expert 
report be stricken and, on a related note, acted within its broad discretion in refusing to 
allow Plaintiff to file an expert report approximately nine months after the deadline 
established by the operative scheduling order.1 
1
 Plaintiff has framed this issue as a subsequent ruling based at least in part upon 
the trial court's earlier ruling granting the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary 
1 
Standard of Review 
A decision to strike an expert report submitted after expiration of the established 
deadline is reviewed both for correctness and abuse of discretion. Posner v. Equity Title 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, \ 8, 222 P.3d 775; Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 
UT52,lfl7,215P.3d933. 
Issue No. 3 
3. Whether the trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief under the Federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act when Plaintiff failed to present evidence of damages in the amount of $5,000 the 
threshold amount for such a claim. 
This issue turns on whether Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to substantiate 
damages aggregating at least $5,000 in value, the statutory threshold for a civil action under 
the CFAA. 
Standard of Review 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., W. Water, 2008 
UT18,H14. 
Judgment. Actually, this issue is entirely separate and distinct from the trial court's 
earlier ruling. Plaintiff designated its expert and served its expert report approximately 
nine months too late and after the hearing on the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; that is why it was stricken. 
2
 Plaintiff has also framed this issue as a subsequent ruling based at least in part 
upon the trial court's earlier ruling granting the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In reality, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for the Eagle 
Gate Parties on Plaintiffs CFAA claim may stand regardless of the trial court's ruling on 
the earlier summary judgment motion. While both of the motions for summary judgment 
were granted for the same reason—Plaintiffs complete failure to substantiate damages— 
they are separate and distinct and one does not flow from the other. 
2 
Issue No. 4. 
4. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it granted the 
Eagle Gate Parties' Motion in Limine precluding Plaintiff from presenting evidence of 
damages at trial.3 
This issue turns in part on whether the trial court had any reasonable basis for 
granting the Motion in Limine, including that (1) allowing the presentation of damages 
would be contrary to the law of the case; (2) evidence of monetary damages was not 
relevant to the issues to be decided at trial; and (3) introduction of evidence of Plaintiff s 
alleged monetary damages would be more prejudicial than probative. Should the Court of 
Appeals reverse the grant of summary judgment on the damages claims, this issue will then 
turn on whether the trial court abused its discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely expert 
report. If not, then damages in the form of expert testimony were properly excluded 
regardless of the earlier ruling on summary judgment. 
Plaintiff has also framed this issue as a subsequent ruling based at least in part 
upon the trial court's earlier ruling granting the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. While the trial court's decision on this issue was perhaps related to its earlier 
ruling in part, this issue also stands alone, however, on one key point. Regardless of the 
trial court's earlier ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert report 
and expert testimony on the issue of damages were properly excluded pursuant to the trial 
court's ruling striking Plaintiffs expert report. 
3 
Standard of Review 
A decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. E.g., Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382, f 9, 174 P.3d 1 
(rev'd on other grounds, 2009 UT 44, 215 P.3d 152); Lee v. Langley, 2005 UT App 339, f 
9, 121 P.3d 33 (citations omitted); Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, % 6, 
63 P.3d 686 (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16: 
(b) Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition 
to any other pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court, upon its own 
motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a scheduling and management 
conference. The attorneys and unrepresented parties shall appear at the scheduling 
and management conference in person or by remote electronic means. Regardless 
whether a scheduling and management conference is held, on motion of a party the 
court shall enter a scheduling order that governs the time: 
(b)(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(b)(2) to file motions; and 
(b)(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order may also include: 
(b)(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1) 
and of the extent of discovery to be permitted; 
(b)(8) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial 
order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial 
conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate 
4 
in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action 
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26: 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person 
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is 
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; 
the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37: 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey 
an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this 
rule or Rule 35, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially 
justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in 
regard to the failure as are just, including the following: 
5 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established 
for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party 
obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in 
evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
render judgment by default against the disobedient party [.] 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or 
other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a 
prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not 
be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for 
the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court 
may take any action authorized by subdivision (6)(2). 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (2003) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the 
conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) 
of subsection (a)(5)(B). 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(b) (2003) 
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least 
$5,000 in value; 
(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or 
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 
or more individuals; 
(iii) physical injury to any person; 
(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or 
(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity 
in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national 
security[.] 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case 
This appeal principally involves Plaintiffs repeated failure over nearly three years 
of litigation to substantiate damages for any of its seven claims against the Eagle Gate 
Parties and specifically in opposition to the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller) ("First 
Motion for Summary Judgment"), which failure lead to grant of summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs claims for damages.4 (Mem. Decision, Jan. 30, 2008, Addendum 
Ex. A, R. 3564-3569; Order Granting Summ. J., Mar. 10, 2008, Addendum Ex. B, R. 
3670-3682.) In particular, the trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to provide the 
type of evidence that it claimed was necessary to show damages, i.e., expert testimony, 
and, therefore, the trial court properly entered summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs 
claims for damages. (Mem. Decision 2-3, Addendum Ex. A, R. 3565-3566.) 
Plaintiffs claims arise in large part from an event that occurred in 2004, when Eagle 
Gate hired two of Plaintiff s former employees, Wallace Rogers and Todd Knecht. (Compl. 
6-7, R. 6-7.) Not long after being hired, these individuals accessed Plaintiffs database 
4
 Although there were multiple motions for summary judgment filed in the matter 
below, only the trial court's rulings regarding the Eagle Gate Parties' 2007 Motion for 
Summary Judgment (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana 
Miller), which the trial court granted as to claims for damages (Mem. Decision, Jan. 30, 
2008, Addendum Ex. A, R. 3564-3569; Order Granting Summ. J , Mar. 10, 2008, 
Addendum Ex. B, R. 3670-3682), and the Eagle Gate Parties' 2009 Motion for Summary 
Judgment (re: Equitable claims against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana 
Miller), which the trial court granted in part (Mem. Decision, Aug. 31, 2009, Addendum 
Ex. C, R. 4364-4370) are relevant for purposes of this appeal. 
7 
online and downloaded a list of Plaintiffs potential students. (Aff. of Wallace Rogers 
("Rogers Aff.") ffl[ 5-7, R. 358-365.) Very shortly after Eagle Gate learned of these 
inappropriate actions, Eagle Gate terminated Messrs. Rogers and Knecht and the lead list 
was incontrovertibly destroyed. (Id. lfl[ 8 & 24, R. 358-365; Dep. of Jana Lee Miller 
("Miller Dep.'5), 67:23-68:20, Jan. 12, 2005, Ex. A to Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J., R. 4295.) Eagle Gate also instructed its remaining employees in writing 
on June 11, 2004, that such conduct would not be tolerated, in accordance with Eagle 
Gate's long-standing policy that employees must "perform their work with . . . the 
highest standards of law and ethics." (Mem. to Eagle Gate Admissions Dept, Ex. O to 
Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., R. 4295.) Over four months later, in 
October 2004, Plaintiff forged ahead with its claims against the Eagle Gate Parties, asserting 
that the lead list had been used by the Eagle Gate Parties, and that Eagle Gate had 
improperly hired its former employees. (Compl. 5-7, R. 5-7.) Plaintiff further asserted that 
it had computed damages in excess of $10,250,000. (Id. at 25-30, R. 25-30.) 
This appeal also involves the trial court's subsequent grant of summary judgment 
on Plaintiffs equitable claim under the CFAA (Mem. Decision 3, Aug. 31, 2009, 
Addendum Ex. C, R. 4366), and two evidentiary rulings made following the initial grant of 
summary judgment. Specifically, the trial court granted a motion in limine precluding 
Plaintiff from presenting evidence of damages (id. at 6, R. 4369) and granted a motion to 
strike Plaintiffs belated expert report (Minute Entry, May 30, 2008, Addendum Ex. D, R. 
3994-3996). Contrary to Plaintiffs framing of these issues, these rulings were not simply 
"based upon the summary judgment ruling," on the First Motion for Summary Judgment 
8 
(Appellant Br. 12). Indeed, two of these rulings, the striking of Plaintiff s untimely expert 
report and the exclusion of evidence of damages, are evidentiary rulings that the Court must 
consider under the abuse of discretion standard, rather than simply viewing them through 
the lens of the ruling on the First Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
A. Plaintiffs Complaint 
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 16, 2004, filing a Complaint against the 
Eagle Gate Parties, among others, asserting claims for Breach of Contract,5 Violation of 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with 
Prospective Economic Relations, Violation of the CFAA, Statutory Unfair Competition, 
and Civil Conspiracy. (Compl., R. 1-30.) Plaintiff claimed that it had incurred, and was 
therefore entitled to, damages in amounts "not less than" $10,250,000. {Id. at 25-30 
(emphasis added), R. 25-30.) Despite the averments in its Complaint of a minimum damage 
amount of not less than $10,250,000, on November 15, 2004, Plaintiff represented in its 
Initial Disclosures that it had "not yet computed the damages it has suffered" as alleged in 
the Complaint. (PL's Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures 7, Ex. A to Aff. of Nathan B. Wilcox, 
R. 3170.) Even more remarkable, when challenged in discovery for the factual basis for its 
purported damages, Plaintiff represented that it could not provide the factual basis for its 
minimum $10,250,000 damage claim because its evidence of damages would have to come 
in the future from its yet to be disclosed experts and expert reports. {See PL's Resp. to 
5
 The Breach of Contract Claim was only asserted against Ms. Miller. (Compl. 
16-17, R. 16-17.) 
9 
Jana Miller's First Set of Interrogs. ("Resp. to Miller Interrogs."), Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 
Ex. E to Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Addendum Ex. E, R. 3266-3277); (PL's 
Resp. to Eagle Gate College and Provo College's First Set of Interrogs. ("Resp. to Eagle 
Gate Interrogs."), Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, Ex. E to Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. J., Addendum Ex. F, R. 3279-3298.) 
Plaintiff also makes the conclusory allegation in its Complaint and brief that Eagle 
Gate improperly hired Plaintiffs employees and that several of these employees used 
Plaintiffs 'lead list" to recruit students, thereby causing harm to Plaintiff. (CompL 5-7, 
R. 5-7.) There is no dispute, however, that Eagle Gate terminated the two employees 
who admitted downloading the lead list immediately thereafter (Rogers Aff. Tffi 18 & 24, 
R. 360-364; Dep. of Steven Todd Knecht, 71:8-74:4, June 12, 2007, Ex. H to Mem. in 
Opp'n to PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., R. 4295); that the lead list was destroyed (Miller 
Dep. 67:23-68:20, Ex. A to Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., R. 4295.); 
that Eagle Gate instructed its remaining employees that such conduct would not be 
tolerated, consistent with its ethical standards (Mem. to Eagle Gate Admissions Dept, 
Ex. O to Mem. in Opp. to PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., R. 4295); that Eagle Gate did 
not hire any of Plaintiff s employees associated with Plaintiffs program for Polynesian 
students; and that Eagle Gate never started its own Polynesian program (Dep. of Jonathan 
W. Bullen, 19:3-18, Mar. 4. 2005, Ex. L to Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J., R. 4295). Nor is there any dispute that of the only two students identified by 
Plaintiff as being improperly recruited by Eagle Gate, both approached Eagle Gate about 
attending there, not the other way around. (Aff. of Jeana Morris, Feb. 8, 2005, ffi[ 2-5, 
10 
Ex. F to Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., R. 4317; Aff. of Brian George 
Shelley ("Shelley Aff."), 1fl[ 3-7, Feb. 8, 2005, Ex. G to Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. J., R. 4317.) 
B. Scheduling Orders and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
On December 30, 2005, the trial court entered the first of four scheduling orders. 
(Rule 26(f) Att'ys Planning Meeting Report and Scheduling Order, R. 1174-1182.) In 
August 2006, and again in November 2006, the parties agreed to extend the discovery 
cutoff date in this matter and the court appropriately entered an Amended Scheduling 
Order on August 29, 2006, and a Second Amended Scheduling Order on November 16, 
2006. (Am. Scheduling Order, R. 1236-1245; Second Am. Scheduling Order, R. 1253-
1255.) 
On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff alone filed a motion to extend the discovery cutoff 
("First Motion to Extend") (PL's Mot. to Extend Disc. Period, R. 1307-1310), 
representing to the trial court that the only remaining discovery it needed to conduct was 
the deposition of Mr. Knecht6 and a review of Ms. Miller's Eagle Gate hard drive. 
(Reply Mem. in Supp. of PL's Mot. to Extend Disc. Period 3-4, 1644-1645.) Absent from 
the First Motion to Extend, limited in scope as it was, is any allegation by Plaintiff that it 
needed any discovery beyond Ms. Millers' hard drive in order to complete its expert 
report on damages. {Id., R. 1642-1647.) Thereafter, on May 10, 2007, the trial court 
entered an order extending the discovery cutoff in this matter to June 18, 2007, and the 
6
 Ironically, Plaintiff had already deposed Mr. Knecht in another matter thereby 
belying Plaintiffs claim that it had been unable to locate Mr. Knecht. {See Supp. Mem. in 
Opp'n to PL's Mot. to Extend Disc, R. 1653.) 
11 
deadline for expert disclosures to June 28, 2007. (Order Granting PL's Mot. to Extend 
Disc. Period, R. 2288-2290.) 
On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery 
Responses, seeking an order compelling the Eagle Gate Parties to produce contact 
information for former employees of Plaintiff who had subsequently worked for either 
Eagle Gate College or Provo College and "a copy of Eagle Gate College's database in its 
original format." (Mem. in Supp. of PL's Mot. to Compel Defs.' Disc. Resp., R. 2464-
2472.) The Motion to Compel was based, in relevant part, on Plaintiffs document 
requests seeking "[c]opies of each lead list prepared, accessed, modified, or otherwise 
used in carrying out his or her responsibilities to Eagle Gate College by Jana Miller, Todd 
Knecht and Wallace Rogers" and "[d]ocuments sufficient to ascertain each and every 
change or alteration to any lead list owned, possessed, or otherwise controlled by Eagle 
Gate College that were made by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht, and Wallace Rogers." (Id. at 
4-5, R. 2467-2468.) 
Eagle Gate and Provo College opposed the Motion to Compel, noting that the 
document requests Plaintiff relied, as set forth above, did not request the production of 
the entirety of Eagle Gate's database. (Eagle Gate and Provo College's Mem. in Opp'n 
to PL's Mot. to Compel Disc. 4-5, R. 2904-2905.) On July 26, 2007, the trial court 
7
 Although Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's ruling on its Motion to 
Compel, it implies in its Statement of the Case that the fact its Motion to Compel was 
pending when Plaintiff filed its Second Motion to Extend, discussed below, the court-
ordered deadlines, somehow impacted its ability to file a timely expert report. (Appellant 
Br. 9.) A brief description of the proceedings relative to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is 
included to address that allegation. 
12 
entered a Minute Entry ruling that, because Plaintiff had not requested the database in 
discovery, the court could not compel its production. (Minute Entry 2, July 26, 2007, 
Addendum Ex. G, R. 2995.) The trial court also noted, based on the pleadings submitted, 
that Eagle Gate College and Provo College had appropriately responded to the requests 
by compiling a list of 37,000 names of potential students and their contact information 
and providing a spreadsheet identifying changes made to the database by Jana Miller. 
(Id.) Accordingly, there was no outstanding discovery to the Eagle Gate Parties. 
On June 26, 2007, two days before the expert witness deadline, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Extend the Dates Set Forth in the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Extend 
Discovery Period ("Second Motion to Extend"), seeking to extend all deadlines, 
including the deadline for fact discovery, which had already passed, and expert witness 
disclosure, for an additional sixty days. (PL's Mot. to Extend the Dates Set Forth in the 
Order Granting PL's Mot. to Extend Disc. Period, R. 2915-2927.) Plaintiff alleged that it 
required the requested extension so that it could review Eagle Gate College's electronic 
Q 
database in "native format" and to depose individuals who formerly worked for Plaintiff 
and subsequently worked for Eagle Gate or Provo College—which Plaintiff had not 
previously mentioned as a reason for extending discovery. (Id.) Plaintiffs Second 
Motion to Extend, while not directly ruled on by the trial court, was essentially denied 
when the trial court granted the First Motion for Summary Judgment. In its 
8
 Significantly, due to the trial court's ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, 
Plaintiff ultimately did not need additional time to review Eagle Gate College's electronic 
database because the court refused to compel its production. (Minute Entry, July 26, 
2007, Addendum Ex. G, R. 2994-3001.) 
13 
Memorandum Decision granting the First Motion for Summary Judgment, discussed 
herein, the trial court stated that although it had not issued a ruling on the Second Motion 
to Extend, Plaintiff "effectively had nearly six months (rather than the 60 days sought) 
to have its experts complete their expert reports on damages" (Mem. Decision 3, Jan. 
30, 2008 (emphasis added), Addendum Ex. A, R. 3566.) 
C. The First Motion for Summary Judgment 
On October 9, 2007, the Eagle Gate Parties filed their First Motion for Summary 
Judgment on all of Plaintiff s claims against them. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (re: Claims 
Against Eagle Gate, Provo College and Jana Miller), R. 3136-3138.) In support of their 
First Motion for Summary Judgment, the Eagle Gate Parties presented evidence that (a) 
Plaintiff had failed to provide a basis for, and a computation of, its damages, (b) Plaintiff 
had failed to provide any expert reports substantiating its damages as it claimed was 
necessary, and (c) the time for expert reports, expert discovery, and fact discovery had 
long passed. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate, 
Provo College and Jana Miller), R. 3139-3156.) 
The Eagle Gate Parties also presented evidence that Plaintiff had repeatedly 
represented that it could only provide evidence of its purported damages or any 
computation thereof through expert testimony. (Id., R. 3146-3149.) For example, on or 
about January 17, 2007, Jana Miller served her First Set of Interrogatories on Plaintiff. 
(See Decl. of Jennifer R. Eshelman, f 6, R. 3127.) Regarding each claim Plaintiff 
asserted against her, Ms. Miller requested that Plaintiff identify "[a]ll damages that 
[Plaintiff] claim[s] to have [or purportedly] suffered as a result of [the alleged acts of Ms. 
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Miller], including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any such 
damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in computing any alleged damages." {See 
Resp. to Miller Interrogs., Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, Addendum. Ex. E, R. 3269-3276.) 
Plaintiff responded to this portion of each such request stating that "Plaintiffs experts 
will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered"" {See id. 
(emphasis added).) Notably absent from Plaintiffs responses regarding damages was 
any reference to the alleged fact witnesses and their deposition testimony that it now 
relies on to substantiate its damages. 
In addition, on or about January 17, 2007, Eagle Gate and Provo College served 
interrogatories on Plaintiff requesting that Plaintiff identify "[a]ll damages that [Plaintiff] 
purportedly suffered as a result of [the various alleged acts of Eagle Gate or Provo 
College], including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any alleged 
damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in computing any alleged damages." {See 
Resp. to Eagle Gate Interrogs., Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, Addendum Ex. F, R. 3281-
3296.) Plaintiff again responded to this portion of the interrogatory by stating that 
"Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages 
suffered"' {See id. (emphasis added).) As before, Plaintiff notably failed to reference the 
alleged fact witnesses and their deposition testimony that it now relies upon. 
Consistent with its prior position, Plaintiff opposed the First Motion for Summary 
Judgment by asserting (i) that it had identified its damages, (ii) that it needed an expert 
witness to provide a calculation of its purported minimum of $10,250,000 damages set 
forth in its Complaint filed in October 2004, and (iii) that it had been unable to provide 
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an expert report during the preceding three years because the Eagle Gate Parties had 
failed to produce documents necessary to the calculation. (Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. 
for Summ. J., R. 3311-3340.) Plaintiff relied upon the same deposition testimony that it 
relies on in making this appeal as proof of its damages. {Id. at R. 3336.) 
The trial court heard oral argument on the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on January 22, 2008. (Mot. Hr'g Tr., Jan. 22, 2008, Addendum Ex. 
H, R. 3574.) During that hearing, Plaintiffs counsel admitted that Plaintiff had not 
determined the cause of its alleged $10,250,000 damages. {Id. at 32:14-33:14.) 
Specifically, Plaintiffs counsel claimed Plaintiff needed additional information before it 
could do a comparison of the parties' lead lists "to make that causation determination." 
(Mat 33:10-14.) 
Having considered all of the parties' submissions, the trial court issued a 
Memorandum Decision on January 30, 2008, ruling that Plaintiff had "failed entirely to 
substantiate its damages claim," and granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on its 
claims against the Eagle Gate Parties. (Mem. Decision 4, Jan. 30, 2008, Addendum Ex. 
A, R. 3567.) The trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision that the "parties agree 
that expert testimony is needed in order to establish damages in this case" that during 
the four years of litigation Plaintiff had ample time in which to provide a damages report, 
and that the deadline for doing so had passed. {Id. at 2, R. 3565.) The trial court further 
noted that "the information which would substantiate such damages is, at least in part, 
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in the Plaintiffs own possession"? that it was not persuaded by Plaintiffs suggestion at 
the hearing that it could not calculate damages until causation could be assessed] and, 
further, that Plaintiff had "apparently made a tactical decision" not to provide an expert 
report. {Id. at 2-4 (emphasis added), R. 3565-67.) 
D. Plaintiffs Motion for Relief From or For Reconsideration of the 
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment 
On March 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief From or for 
Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment ("Motion for 
Reconsideration"). (R. 3686-3689.) Plaintiff asserted in support of that motion that it 
had substantiated its damages through the testimony of its representatives, and also 
submitted the untimely Expert Report of Brad Townsend. (PL's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 
for Relief from or Recons. of the Court's Order on Summ. J., R. 3693-3721.) Plaintiff 
also contended that it was entitled to proceed to trial on its claims for injunctive relief. 
(id.) 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs motion as it pertained to Plaintiffs claims for 
damages, stating that Plaintiff was simply rearguing its earlier opposition. (Minute Entry 
9
 The trial court's conclusion on this point is substantiated by Plaintiffs Opening 
Brief in which Plaintiff states that it suffered many different types of damages including: 
"(i) the lost productivity of the experienced employees . . .; (ii) the costs of hiring and 
training less experienced and less productive employees; (iii) the costs associated with 
ineffective advertising and marketing . . . ;(iv) the effects of reduced morale on various 
campuses; and (v) the lost tuition payments from students who would have otherwise 
attended Stevens-Henager." (Appellant Br. 11.) Information necessary to establish 
these categories of damages is partially, if not entirely, within Plaintiffs control—not 
the Eagle Gate Parties'. The Eagle Gate Parties have no information pertaining to, or 
documents evidencing, the lost productivity of Plaintiff s employees, the costs of hiring 
and training replacement employees, the costs of advertising and marketing, the effects of 
loss of morale, or the loss in tuition dollars. 
17 
1-2, May 12, 2008, Addendum Ex. I, R. 3987-88.) Regarding the untimely expert report, 
the trial court noted that Plaintiff could have submitted a timely expert report had it 
chosen to do so, as evidenced by its ability to provide a report after the court entered 
summary judgment without further discovery. (Id.) The trial court, however, granted 
Plaintiffs motion as it pertained to Plaintiffs equitable claims. (Id.) 
E. The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion to Strike the Preliminary Expert 
Report of Brad Townsend 
In response to Plaintiffs belated filing of the Preliminary Expert Report of Brad 
Townsend, the Eagle Gate Parties filed a Motion to Strike both the Expert Report and the 
Affidavit of Mr. Townsend that Plaintiff filed in support of its Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R. 3909-3909B.) The Eagle Gate Parties called attention to the patent 
fact that the Expert Report, dated March 21, 2008, was filed approximately nine months 
after the deadline for expert reports. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike Prelim. Expert 
Report of Brad Townsend & the Aff. of Brad Townsend, R. 3910-3917.) In opposition, 
Plaintiff curiously asserted that the Expert Report was properly filed because Plaintiff had 
a motion to extend discovery pending before the court, and because the Expert Report 
established Plaintiffs damages, and therefore constituted "new evidence." (PL's Mem. in 
Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Strike Prelim. Expert Report of Brad Townsend & the Aff. of 
Brad Townsend , R. 3950-3956.) 
In their Reply, the Eagle Gate Parties explained that the Export Report was 
undeniably untimely, that there was no need for the trial court to rule on Plaintiffs 
Motion to Extend once it had entered summary judgment, and that the Expert Report did 
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not constitute new evidence. (Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike Prelim. Expert 
Report of Brad Townsend & Aff. of Brad Townsend, R. 3957-3965.) On May 30, 2008, 
the trial court granted the Motion to Strike based on the court's recent ruling on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and the grounds articulated by the Eagle Gate 
Parties in their Motion. (Minute Entry, May 30, 2008, Addendum. Ex. D, R. 3994-3996). 
Thereafter, on June 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, 
which was denied on June 30, 2008. (Order (den. pet.), R. 4018-4019.) Almost seven 
months later on January 13, 2009, the trial court issued a Notice of Order to Show Cause. 
(R. 4020-4022.) The matter was subsequently set for trial solely on Plaintiffs equitable 
claims and the trial court invited additional motion practice prior to trial. 
F. The Eagle Gate Parties' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Eagle Gate Parties thereafter filed their Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs equitable claims. (R. 4079-4082.) The trial court 
partially granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claims 
under the CFAA and the Unfair Competition Act. (Mem. Decision 3, Aug. 31, 2009, 
Addendum Ex. C, R. 4366.) Significantly, on Plaintiffs CFAA claim the trial court ruled 
that in light of its prior ruling, Plaintiff could not substantiate damages aggregating of at 
least $5,000 and, therefore, could not meet the statutory threshold for bringing a civil 
action under the CFAA. (Id.) Also significantly, the trial court gave due consideration to 
the testimony of Plaintiff s representative, Ms. Dewsnup, on this point. (Id.) 
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G. The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion in Limine 
The Eagle Gate Parties also filed a Motion in Limine (R. 4051-4053) to preclude 
Plaintiff from presenting any evidence of damages at trial on the grounds that (1) to find 
otherwise would be contrary to the law of the case; (2) monetary damages are not relevant 
to the issues to be decided at trial; i.e., the request for injunctive relief; and (3) introduction 
of evidence of Plaintiffs alleged monetary damages would be more prejudicial than 
probative. (Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. in 
Limine to Exclude Evidence of Monetary Damages, R. 4054-4078.) Plaintiff opposed the 
Motion in Limine, contending that it was entitled to present evidence of its losses up to 
$5,000 in order to meet the requirements of the CFAA. (Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mots, in 
Limine, R. 4293.) On August 31, 2009, the trial court granted the Motion in Limine, ruling 
that the issue of damages is irrelevant to the remaining claims. (Mem. Decision 6, Aug. 31, 
2009, Addendum Ex. C, R. 4369.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiff failed to substantiate its damages, a 
necessary element for each of its claims. Plaintiff itself repeatedly set the bar for 
providing evidence of its damages—expert testimony. Having set that bar, however, 
Plaintiff then made the tactical decision to not file an expert report prior to the Court-
ordered deadline or even in opposition to the First Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff made this decision despite the fact that it was undeniably able to prepare an 
expert report based on information within its control. 
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In addition, the Court may reject Plaintiffs contention that it presented evidence 
that the actions of the Eagle Gate Parties were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs 
damages, or, in other words, of the fact of damage. Rather, the evidence, vague 
deposition testimony from Plaintiffs representatives, is nothing more than bald 
speculation. Even when given the best spin possible in Plaintiffs brief, the evidence 
presented by Plaintiff is not such that a jury could make a reasonably approximation of 
damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff admitted at the hearing on the First Motion for 
Summary Judgment that it had not yet determined causation. 
The Court may also reject Plaintiffs superficial argument that this Court should 
also vacate three later rulings as based "in part"10 on the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. With no application of law to fact beyond stating the obvious—that these 
rulings were subsequent to the earlier ruling on summary judgment—Plaintiff insists that 
the following rulings should be vacated: (1) the order striking Plaintiffs extremely tardy 
expert report; (2) the order precluding Plaintiff from presenting evidence of damages at 
trial; and (3) the granting of summary judgment for the Eagle Gate Parties on Plaintiffs 
equitable claim under the CFAA. These rulings, however, are not dependent on the 
earlier ruling. 
The trial court ordered Plaintiffs expert report to be stricken because it was filed 
268 days after the deadline established by the operative scheduling order. Presumably 
10
 By stating that the subsequent rulings were based uin part" on the earlier ruling 
on summary judgment, Plaintiff admits that the rulings were at the very least based "in 
part" on something entirely separate from the court's earlier ruling. This admission alone 
defeats Plaintiffs position. 
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based at least in part on the ruling striking Plaintiffs expert report, the trial court then 
granted the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion in Limine precluding Plaintiff from presenting 
evidence of damages at trial. Finally, the trial court's holding that Plaintiff failed to 
present evidence of at least $5,000 in damages, thereby precluding its CFAA claim, is not 
dependent on the court's earlier decision on summary judgment. Although both 
decisions stem from Plaintiffs failure to present evidence of damages, that does not 
require the vacation of this decision. Even if the Court were to reverse the earlier ruling, 
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing $5,000 worth of damages and now 
cannot due to the trial court's striking of its expert report. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Granted the First Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Throughout this case, in hearings, papers and every response to written discovery, 
Plaintiff has repeatedly and adamantly represented that expert testimony was required to 
establish its purported minimum of $10,250,000 in damages in this matter. Further, 
Plaintiff never identified the individuals it now relies on as witnesses who would 
establish Plaintiffs damages. Plaintiffs counsel repeated the expert testimony mantra at 
the hearing before Judge Faust on the Eagle Gate Parties' First Motion for Summary 
Judgment, stating "this is the type of case, Judge, where damages are going to be 
difficult to determine. And this is exactly the kind of case contemplated by Rule 702 of 
the Utah Rule of Evidence, where an expert is necessary." (Mot. Hr'g Tr. 12:22-25, 
Jan. 22, 2008 (emphasis added), Addendum Ex. H, R. 3574.) Despite this admitted 
burden of proof, Plaintiff failed to file an expert report in accordance with the deadline 
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established by the trial court's scheduling order. Even more remarkable, two months 
after the trial court enter summary judgment against Plaintiff for failing to present 
evidence of damages, Plaintiff was able to file an expert report without any additional 
information. (Minute Entry 1-2, May 12, 2008, Addendum Ex. I, R. 3987-3988.) 
Plaintiff was clearly capable of providing an expert report as it had claimed was 
necessary to establish its damages, but apparently intentionally chose not to do so. 
Summary judgment was properly granted on that basis alone. 
In addition, even if an expert report were not necessary to establish damages, as 
Plaintiff now asserts in stark contrast to its repeated responses to written discovery 
requests, it also failed to establish the fact of damages, i.e., causation. Accordingly, the 
trial court properly entered summary judgment on Plaintiffs damages claims. 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Substantiate Its Damages Through Timely Expert 
Testimony. 
Despite its oft-repeated mantra that "Plaintiffs experts will provide information 
and analysis concerning the damages suffered," Plaintiff failed to submit a timely expert 
report on damages. The trial court, finding that the time for doing so had passed, 
properly granted the Eagle Gate Parties' First Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mem. 
Decision 4, Jan. 30, 2008, Addendum Ex. A, R. 3567.) Plaintiffs failure to submit a 
timely expert report was not due to lack of documents or other information, nor was it 
due to the lack of a ruling on Plaintiffs motion to extend discovery deadlines a fourth 
time.11 Rather, as the trial court recognized, Plaintiff made a "tactical decision" not to 
11
 Indeed, as discussed in the Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts, the 
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file its expert report despite having sufficient information with which to compile an 
expert report. (Id.) This conclusion was based on comments made by Plaintiffs counsel 
at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment that even though Plaintiff had the 
information it needed to file an expert report, even if preliminarily, "rather than 
piecemeal [the expert report], we wanted to give a complete and accurate damage 
calculation so it wouldn't be used against us at a later date." (Mot. Hr'g Tr. 35:15-17, 
Addendum Ex. H, R. 3574) Plaintiff knew its expert report was due; it simply 
intentionally chose not to provide it for tactical reasons, or even to identify its expert. As 
stated by Judge Faust, "[i]t was simple inaction and lack of diligence on the part of the 
Plaintiff that led to the Court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment." (Minute 
Entry 2, May 12, 2008, Addendum Ex. I, R. 3988.) A court's role is not to relieve a party 
of the consequences of its lack of diligence or ill-advised tactical decisions. See Schmitz 
v. Yukon-Koyukuk School Dist, 147 P.3d 720, 727 (Alaska 2006) (affirming denial of 
motion for reconsideration where trial court found "new evidence" to be untimely 
because it could have been submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment but 
was withheld for "tactical reasons"). 
A similar decision was recently upheld by this Court in Posner v. Equity Title Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, f 23, 222 P.3d 775. In Posner, a seller of real property 
Eagle Gate Parties did not owe Plaintiff any discovery when their First Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed. Further, as evidenced by Plaintiffs first solo motion to 
extend discovery deadlines, it only needed to review Ms. Miller's hard drive and depose 
Todd Knecht. 
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sued his real estate broker for breach of fiduciary duty. 2009 UT App 347, |^ 4. The 
broker moved for and was granted summary judgment on the grounds that expert 
testimony was required to prove it had breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and the 
testimony of the expert and his report had been excluded. Id. at [^ 7. On appeal, the 
plaintiff asserted (i) that the court had erred in finding expert testimony was necessary to 
prove his claim, and (ii) that the exclusion of his expert was an "egregious sanction" 
warranting reversal. Id. at fflf 20, 23. 
This Court agreed that the plaintiff needed expert testimony to prove his breach of 
fiduciary duty claim and, further, found no error by the trial court in excluding the 
plaintiffs sole expert. Id. at f 25. In reaching that decision, the Court noted that the 
record showed the plaintiff had failed to designate his expert during the nearly three and 
one-half years the case had been pending, and did not designate his expert until two weeks 
after the deadline when the defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. Thus, this Court 
concluded in Posner that the trial court had acted within its discretion in finding Posner 
had failed to show good cause and in excluding the expert report. Id. 
Although Plaintiff now tries to disavow its prior representations otherwise, 
Plaintiff repeatedly represented that it needed expert testimony to prove its claims. (Mem. 
in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 27-28, R. 3337-3338.) Specifically, in opposition 
to the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff stated that: 
Plaintiffs claims require among other things, a determination of the value 
of Plaintiffs Lead List, which is a trade secret; the diminution in value 
The plaintiff in Posner also sued his escrow agent and brought additional claims 
that are not relevant here. 
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caused by Defendants' illegal and unauthorized access of that trade secret; 
an analysis of the impact of Defendants' breach of employment contracts 
on [Plaintiffs] enrollment rates and the value of Plaintiff; and an analysis 
of the increased costs and decreased productivity caused by Defendants' 
poaching of Plaintiff s employees. A calculation of these types of damages 
requires "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 
(Id at28,R.3338).13 
Although Plaintiff now attempts to couch its need for an expert as merely to 
provide a "calculation" of its damages, it is clear from the above statement that what 
Plaintiff needed from an expert was much more than a mathematical analysis. Indeed, 
rather than provide evidence of its purported damages, Plaintiff repeatedly represented 
that it needed an expert to substantiate its damages; i.e., to testify as to effect of the 
alleged acts of the Eagle Gate Parties. As in Posner, expert testimony was necessary for 
Plaintiff to prove its claims and Plaintiff is estopped from now claiming otherwise.14 
Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony to substantiate its damages and the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment against it. 
B. Plaintiff Failed to Present Evidence of the Fact of Damages Through 
Non-Expert Testimony. 
Plaintiff relies on several cases for the rather unremarkable proposition that once a 
finding of proximate cause of damages has been made, the plaintiff need not "precisely 
identify the extent of Plaintiff s damages." (Appellant Br. 15 (citing Sohm v. Dixie Eye 
Notably, this portion of Plaintiffs argument highlights that it did not present 
evidence of the "fact of damages" at the time it opposed the Eagle Gate Parties' motion. 
Indeed, Plaintiff admits here that it had not performed any analysis of the effects, if any, 
of the Eagle Gate Parties' alleged actions. The fact that Plaintiff did not present evidence 
establishing the fact of damages is discussed in further detail in section B below. 
14
 The exclusion of Plaintiffs expert report is also supported by the decision in 
Posner as discussed in section II below. 
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Ctr., 2007 UT App 235, % 17, 166 P.3d 614).) However, as discussed below, none of the 
testimony Plaintiff cites demonstrates the fact of damages or, in other words, that the 
actions of the Eagle Gate Parties were the proximate cause of any alleged injury, much 
less the purported minimum of $10,250,000 it claims it suffered. Plaintiff admitted as 
much in the hearing for the First Motion for Summary Judgment when its counsel 
claimed an inability to provide a timely expert report because Plaintiff had been unable to 
"make that causation determination" (Mot. Hr'g Tr. 32:3-33:14, Addendum Ex. H, R. 
3574.) The vast difference between the evidence presented in the cases Plaintiff cites and 
the evidence it presented at the trial court is evidenced by a careful review of the cases 
first and then the testimony Plaintiff relies on below. 
Plaintiff first cites to this Court's decision in Sohm, (Appellant Br. 15.) In Sohm, 
the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants in a medical malpractice 
action, finding that the plaintiffs expert had failed to "identify or establish what damage 
was caused by [defendants' alleged negligence." 2007 UT App 235, Tf 11, 166 P.3d 614. 
This Court noted, however, that the trial court also found sufficient testimony by the 
expert to establish proximate cause. Id. This Court in Sohm held that "a finding of 
proximate cause necessarily includes a finding of identifiable injury." Id. at f^ 17. Thus, 
the issue in Sohm, unlike here, was whether "in light of [the finding of proximate cause], 
the trial court was entitled to rule, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff failed to present 
evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment because her expert did not 
precisely identify the extent of Plaintiff s damages." Id, This Court decided that issue in 
the negative and held that evidence presented by the expert that the defendants' conduct 
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"was responsible for the damage to Plaintiffs eyes and the significant loss of vision she 
sustained in her right eye" was sufficient evidence of the fact of damages to avoid 
summary judgment. Id. atffif 19-20. 
Unlike the facts in Sohrn, Plaintiff has not shown, nor did Judge Faust find, that 
the Eagle Gate Parties' actions had proximately caused Plaintiffs purported damages. 
Indeed, Plaintiff admittedly had not made a "causation determination." (Mot. Hr'g Tr., 
32:3-33:14, Addendum Ex. H, R. 3574.) Thus, this Court's analysis in Sohm is 
inapposite because Plaintiff has not presented evidence establishing that the alleged acts 
of the Eagle Gate Parties were the proximate cause of any purported "damages." 
Plaintiff next cites to Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., as providing 
confirmation that demonstrating the fact of damages, without quantification of damages, 
is sufficient to avoid summary judgment. (Appellant Br. 15-16 (citing Renegade Oil, 
2004 UT App 356, ^ 13, 101 P.3d 383).) In Renegade Oil, the plaintiff sued its insurance 
agent for negligence for failing to notify the insurer of the plaintiffs newly acquired 
vehicle, which failure resulted in a denial of coverage when the new vehicle was involved 
in an accident. Renegade Oil, 2004 UT App 356, %3. As a result, the plaintiff had to 
defend against a personal injury lawsuit itself. Id. at 1fl[ 3-4. The defendant moved for a 
directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff "failed to present any direct evidence of 
damages at trial," although the plaintiff had presented evidence of the underlying 
personal injury lawsuit. Id. at |^ 11. The trial court denied defendant's motion, noting 
that evidence of the underlying personal injury lawsuit provided "more than sufficient 
evidence of either real or anticipated damage to be suffered ...." Id. 
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This Court agreed with the trial court, explaining that "there exists a 'reasonable 
probability that [plaintiff] suffered damage as a result of [its agent's] breach' and that the 
amount of damages would equal the costs related to the [underlying] lawsuit that 
otherwise would have been covered by the Policy." Id. at f^ 13 (quoting Atkin Wright & 
Miles v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)). Thus, in 
Renegade Oil, the plaintiff had established not only the fact of damages, i.e., proximate 
cause, but it was also clear how the amount of damages would be calculated, even though 
the exact amount of damages from the ongoing litigation had not been presented. Id. at ^ | 
13. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Renegade Oil, therefore, supports the 
unremarkable proposition that "c[t]he amount of damages may be based upon 
approximations, if the fact of damage is established, and the approximations are based 
upon reasonable assumptions or projections?" Id. at f^ 12 {quoting Atkin Wright & 
Miles, 709 P.2d at 336 (emphasis added)). Unlike the plaintiff in Renegade Oil, Plaintiff 
wholly failed to establish the fact of damages or to present any evidence from which 
reasonable assumptions or projections could be made. Indeed, its Interrogatory Answers 
confirmed that in the absence of an expert report, it had no evidence of damages period. 
Thus, the holding of Renegade Oil is not akin to Plaintiffs situation here. 
Plaintiff finally points to Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias as further 
confirming that summary judgment is inappropriate where a plaintiff provides evidence 
of the fact of damages, but not the amount of damages. (Appellant Br. 16 (citing 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323).) In Anderson Development, a 
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third party testified that he raised the purchase price for the real property he sold to the 
plaintiff due to the alleged misrepresentations of the defendants. 2005 UT 36, f 33. The 
Supreme Court in Anderson Development ruled that this third-party testimony created a 
reasonable inference that the defendants' alleged misrepresentations had caused the 
plaintiff to pay more for the real property and that this evidence, although "thin," was 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on the element of damages. Id. Notably, as 
evidenced by the below discussed deposition testimony, Plaintiff supplied no such 
equivalent third party testimony. For example, Plaintiff offered no testimony from a 
potential student who did not attend Plaintiffs school due to the Eagle Gate Parties5 
purported actions. Rather, Plaintiff chose to rely upon the inadmissible speculation of its 
captured employees. The absence of even "thin" evidence here makes the analysis of 
Anderson Development inapplicable to Plaintiffs situation. 
Turning now to the deposition testimony Plaintiff relied on, it is evident not only 
how different in nature it is from the evidence in the cases discussed above, but also that 
Judge Faust was correct when he found that Appellant "failed entirely to substantiate its 
damages claim." (Mem. Decision 4, Jan. 30, 2008, Addendum Ex. A, R. 3567.) 
Carol Gastiger's Testimony 
The first thing the Court should note with regard to Plaintiffs rendition of Carol 
Gastiger's testimony is how demonstrably inaccurate it is with regard to Ms. Gastiger's 
"calculation" of "damages." (Appellant Br. 17-18.) Plaintiff states in its Statement of 
Facts that Ms. Gastiger testified in her deposition that there was "reduced productivity 
from the loss of Stevens-Henager's 'Admission Consultant,' where the lost consultant 
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had averaged 8 student recruits per month but her replacement at Stevens-Henager 
averaged only 5 students per month, which resulted in lost tuition dollars. (R. 3332-33)." 
(Appellant Br. 7.)15 From this, the Court would understandably have the impression that 
Plaintiff actually hired a replacement admissions consultant who averaged less recruits 
per month than the lost employee. That impression, however, would not be supported by 
the actual record. The portion of the record Plaintiff cites reveals that Ms. Gastiger was 
simply speculating in a hypothetical, not testifying about actual facts within her 
knowledge: 
Q. I want you to tell me what facts you're aware of that would support 
an allegation Eagle Gate College or Provo College caused damage to 
Stevens-Henager. 
A. . . . / believe that when you lose a very competent Admissions 
Consultant you lose production for a period of time. That results in— 
let's say that I replace Tecia and the other person starts five people a 
month. Tecia is averaging eight. That's a total of nine people in a given 
three-month period of time, if this other person ever gets as good as Tecia. 
You multiply that time[s] tuition. That's money—real money, in my 
opinion, that's been lost. Those are real dollars, I think. 
(Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 22-23 (emphasis added), Addendum Ex. J, 
R. 3332.) Ms. Gastiger did not testify that she replaced Tecia with anyone or that the 
replacement actually did start five people a month, or ten or twenty. Instead, Ms. 
Gastiger speculated about how she thought Plaintiff could—but ironically did not— 
15
 Plaintiff makes a similar statement in its Argument section: "Ms. Gastiger 
testified that when you take the number of fewer students recruited by the replacement 
employee—3 per month—and 'multiply that times tuition,' then that is 'real money, in 
my opinion' that's been lost. (R. 3332-33.)" (Appellant Br. 17.) 
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prove damages}6 No matter how Plaintiff spins it, Ms. Gastiger's hypothetical damage 
"calculations" are not evidence of damages. 
Equally problematic for Appellant is Ms. Gastiger's testimony concerning the 
"loss of the Tongan population" and the money spent recruiting "that population." (Id. at 
22.) Also in response to the above quoted question concerning facts that support a claim 
of damages Ms. Gastiger responded: "I think the loss of the Tongan population. I think 
the money we extended on it. I mean in very real dollars. And in very non-real dollars, 
in time and in effort. That are not in specific dollars." (Id.) Even if Ms. Dewsnup's 
unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture and speculation surrounding the "loss of the Tongan 
population" could create an issue of material fact concerning damages, which they 
cannot,17 there is absolutely no evidence that the alleged "loss of the Tongan population" 
was an injury proximately caused by the Eagle Gate Parties that caused damages to 
Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiffs brief demonstrates the opposite. 
Plaintiffs brief makes clear that even it does not contend that Eagle Gate 
proximately caused the "loss of the Tongan population." Rather, Plaintiff contends that 
Eagle Gate simply "attempted" to steal its program and tried to hire its recruiters. 
Plaintiff states: 
In addition, Eagle Gate also attempted to steal Stevens-Henager's 
Polynesian Program by trying to hire Mosese Iongi and Trevor Smith, who 
16
 Ms. Gastiger's testimony further highlights that Plaintiff knew how to compute 
and provide evidence of its purported damages, but despite that knowledge, chose for 
tactical reasons not to do so. 
17
 See Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (affidavits 
in opposition to motion for summary judgment may not be considered if "largely based 
on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs"). 
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recruited Tongan students for Stevens-Henager. After Stevens-Henager 
had spent more than $200,000 on recruiting efforts in the Tongan 
community, Eagle Gate attempted to recruit these employees to enroll the 
very students they previously had been recruiting for Stevens-Henager. 
(Appellant Br. 5 (emphasis added) (citing R. 7-8).) There is, however, no cause of action 
for attempted interference and, accordingly, allegations of such attempted interference do 
not prove the fact of damages. Moreover, it is undisputed that (1) Eagle Gate never 
offered Messrs. Iongi and Smith a position with Eagle Gate, and (2) that Eagle Gate 
never started a "Polynesian program" or recruited the "Tongan population." (Dep. of 
Jonathan W. Bullen, 19:3-18, Mar. 4, 2005, Ex. L to Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J., R. 4295.) Thus, Eagle Gate did not even "attempt" to hire Messrs. 
Iongi and Smith or to recruit students from the Tongan community. Plaintiff, therefore, 
failed to substantiate its damages on this basis as well. 
Vicki Dewsnup's Testimony 
Ms. Dewsnup's testimony also fails to create an issue of material fact surrounding 
damages. In total, Plaintiff presented the following deposition testimony of Ms. 
Dewsnup as evidence of damages: 
• "There's extensive costs incurred in advertising and marketing. We 
continue to use any leads that come into the college from time to time, and 
with the loss of adequate phone numbers due to admissions by Mr. Rogers, 
it became difficult, if not impossible, to use our own leads." 
• "There was economic damage, certainly, and also damage to morale at the 
campuses effected." 
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• "There was loss of employees." 
(Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 23-24, Addendum Ex. J, R. 3333-
3334.) Ms. Dewsnup's statements of her opinions could hardly be more speculative. 
Moreover, Ms. Dewsnup's bald reference to "extensive costs incurred in advertising and 
marketing" only highlights the lack of evidence of damages. Crucially, there is no 
evidence in the record that Plaintiff actually spent money on advertising. Even if there 
were, there is also no evidence in the record of how much of this hypothetical advertising 
money was directed at students who were allegedly recruited away by Eagle Gate 
College—a necessary number to establish damages. Not only is there absolutely no 
evidence in the record below as to any "costs incurred in advertising and marketing," but 
Plaintiff attempts to now interpret Ms. Dewsnup's opinion to be that the advertising and 
marketing were rendered "ineffective" when Eagle Gate allegedly misappropriated the 
student leads purportedly generated by the advertising and marketing. (Appellant Br. 7.) 
This interpretation stretches Ms. Dewsnup's vague testimony to its limits. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff presented no proof that its advertising was rendered ineffective. Plaintiff would 
have to have presented evidence that it lost students to Eagle Gate, which it did not do. 
In addition, under Utah law, Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for costs of 
advertising allegedly rendered ineffective on a claim for interference with contractual and 
economic relations in any event. Rather, Plaintiff is entitled to "(a) the pecuniary loss of 
the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation; (b) consequential losses for which 
the interference is a legal cause; and (c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation if 
they are reasonably to be expected to result from the interference." See Truegreen Co., 
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L.L.C. v. Mower Bros.} Inc., 2008 UT 81, ^ 22, 199 P.3d 929 (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 774(A) (1979)) (holding that the correct measure of damages for 
interference with contractual and economic relations is lost profits). Because the 
advertising and marketing in question were sunk costs, i.e., monies already spent prior to 
any alleged tortious conduct by the Eagle Gate Parties, the Eagle Gate Parties' alleged 
acts were not and could not have been the proximate cause or the legal cause of that so-
called "tremendous," but unquantifiable damage. Furthermore, Plaintiff presented no 
proof that its advertising was rendered ineffective. Plaintiff would have to have 
presented evidence that it lost students to Eagle Gate, which it did not do. 
Next, Ms. Dewsnup's testimony concerning Plaintiffs inability to use its leads 
and its alleged "economic damage" as a result of the Eagle Gate Parties' actions is rank 
speculation. Moreover, to establish damages for lost profits stemming from the alleged 
losses associated with its lead list, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to enable the 
fact finder to "make a reasonable approximation." See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, 2001 UT 107, ^ 76, 37 P.3d 1130 (citation omitted). Or, in other words, "fljost 
profits must be established with reasonable certainty." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). Ms. Dewsnup's bald statements as to "economic damage" provide no evidence 
from which a fact finder could make any approximation of damages, let alone a 
reasonable approximation, and do not create an issue of material fact. 
Likewise, the mere fact that Eagle Gate hired Plaintiffs former employees does 
not establish the fact of damages. Plaintiff presented no evidence below that the 
employees in question were even replaced, the cost of that replacement, or whether the 
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replacements performed at a lower or higher level. Indeed, Ms. Gastiger's hypothetical 
replacement employee discussed above could have just as easily gone the other way and 
brought in twice as many starts as the employee who left. The fact is that there is no 
evidence from which a fact finder could determine that the hiring of Plaintiffs former 
employees was the proximate cause of any damages whatsoever. 
Carl Barney's Testimony 
Finally, as with Ms. Gastiger, Mr. Barney's unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture 
and speculation that Plaintiff suffered damages due to the acts of the Eagle Gate Parties, 
do not suffice to create an issue of material fact concerning damages. See Brown v. 
Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (affidavits in opposition to motion 
for summary judgment may not be considered if "largely based on unsubstantiated 
opinions, conjecture, and beliefs"). Indeed, all of Mr. Barney's testimony on which 
Plaintiff relies is admittedly just his opinion: 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what the damages are suffered by Stevens-
Henager as a result of the alleged conduct of the defendants in this case? 
A: Many million of dollars. 
Q. When did you form that opinion? 
A. At the time that all of this was revealed, the bad acts of Eagle Gate and Provo 
College were revealed to me, and connecting with the loss of the starts, that's when I 
formed that opinion. 
R. Many millions of dollars? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Are we talking more than $10 million? 
A. It could be. 
Q. In forming that opinion, what factors or facts did you consider? 
A. The damage to at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden. 
Q. In damage, you mean the decline in the number of starts? 
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A. The decline of starts. The decline of morale. The struggle. The losses. The 
economic losses. The effort. The cost of rebuilding. 
Q. What were the economic losses? 
A. The loss of starts, which then would result into an income stream over three or 
four years. The cost of hiring and training new people. The efforts to rebuild the 
admissions department. Where we would be today had this not—this impact not 
occurred. 
(Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 24-25 (emphasis added), Addendum Ex. J, 
R. 3334-3335.) As discussed above, to establish damages for lost profits associated with 
the decline in starts, Appellant must do more than simply speculate that its damages 
"could be" more than $10 million. Mr. Barney's speculation as to what his company's 
damages possibly could be does not present a fact finder with sufficient evidence to 
enable the fact finder to "make a reasonable approximation" or, more importantly, create 
an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Kilpatrick, 2001 UT 107, f^ 76. 
Moreover, nothing in Mr. Barney's testimony provides evidence that ties Plaintiffs 
alleged damages to the actions of the Eagle Gate Parties. Thus, Mr. Barney's testimony 
does not establish the Eagle Gate Parties' alleged actions were the proximate cause of any 
damages to Plaintiff, period, let alone damages that possibly "could" exceed $10 million. 
Contrary to Appellant's contention, this testimony is not remotely akin to the 
situation where an expert testifies that a doctor's negligence caused damage to a patient's 
eyes as in Sohm, or a plaintiff shows it is being sued and forced to defend it at its own 
cost due to a denial of insurance coverage as in Renegade, or even where a third party has 
testified that she took a different action due to the actions of the defendants as in 
Anderson Development. Rather, this deposition testimony is a prime example of rank 
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speculation and opinion with hypothetical thrown in for good measure, from which a 
fact finder could not possibly find the fact of damage. 
In addition, as with Ms. Dewsnup's testimony, Mr. Barney's testimony provides 
nothing from which a fact finder could make a reasonable approximation of damages. 
Mr. Barney's self-serving and wholly speculative testimony that Plaintiffs damages are 
"many millions of dollars" and that its damages "could be" more than $10 million, is 
patently insufficient. As Ms. Gastiger's hypothetical also falls short of the mark, Plaintiff 
presented no evidence below that would allow a jury to approximate any amount of 
damages with reasonable certainty, let alone a minimum of $10,250,000. 
The deposition testimony Plaintiff presented does not substantiate its damages or 
establish the fact of damages and the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
against it on its claims for damages. 
II. The Court Correctly Ordered Plaintiffs Belated Expert Report to be 
Stricken and Was Well Within Its Discretion to Refuse to Allow It. 
Plaintiff asks the Court, without discussion of the merits or analysis of the 
arguments made below, to summarily reverse the trial court's ruling striking the belated 
expert report because it was based "in part" on the earlier ruling on summary judgment. 
There can be no good faith dispute, however, that Plaintiff served its Expert Report 268 
days after the deadline established by the operative scheduling order. Thus, there also 
can be no dispute that it was properly excluded by Judge Faust and that he was well 
within his broad discretion in doing so. In addition, contrary to Plaintiffs attempt to 
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frame the court's decision to strike its untimely expert report as flowing from its earlier 
ruling on summary judgment, it is entirely distinct from that earlier ruling. 
"As a general rule, '[t]rial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts.'" Posner, 2009 UT App 347, Tf 23 (quoting Preston & Chambers, 
P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). This broad discretion includes 
establishing scheduling orders governing discovery deadlines and imposing sanctions as 
authorized by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) in the event that a party fails to obey 
a scheduling order. Id. f 23 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3) and (d)). 
Relevant to the trial court's decision to strike Plaintiffs belated expert report, Rule 
37(b)(2) provides in part that "[i]f a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) 
. . . the court . . . may . . . prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence; . . . 
[and] strike pleadings or parts thereof. . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) and (C). In 
addition, Rule 37(f) mandates an additional sanction for a failure to disclose a witness, 
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a). Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f); Posner, 2009 
UT App 347, If 23 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f)). Specifically, Rule 37(f) states that the 
"party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any 
hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose" Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). 
This Court recently addressed exactly the same issue presented here in Posner. 
There, the trial court set a deadline for designating expert witnesses of December 12, 
2006. Posner, 2009 UT App 347, f 24. The plaintiff, however, did not disclose his expert 
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witness until December 26, 2006—a mere fourteen days late. Id. The trial court excluded 
the expert report, finding the plaintiff had missed the deadline, that no agreement to 
extend the deadline existed, and that the plaintiff had failed to show good cause for the 
untimely filing. Id. at ffl[ 24-25. This Court found no error in the trial court excluding the 
report. The Court noted that the record showed that the plaintiff had failed to designate 
his expert during the nearly three and one-half years the case had been pending, and did 
not designate his expert until the defendant moved for summary judgment, two weeks 
after the deadline for designation. Id. at % 25. Accordingly, the Court in Posner, 
concluded that the trial court had acted within its discretion in finding the plaintiff had 
failed to show good cause and, therefore, excluding the expert report. Id. 
Plaintiffs conduct here is even more egregious than the plaintiffs in Posner. 
Plaintiffs expert report was filed 268 days late as opposed to the mere fourteen days late 
in Posner. In addition, Plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Posner, had years to designate an 
expert and failed to do so until after the deadline and the Eagle Gate Parties, like the 
defendant in Posner, filed a motion for summary judgment. But unlike the plaintiff in 
Posner, who at least designated his expert in response to the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiff chose instead to wait and file it two months after the trial 
court's decision granting the Eagle Gate Parties' First Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This delay is made more significant considering the fact Plaintiff controlled the 
information necessary for its expert report. (Mem. Decision 4, Jan. 30, 2008, Addendum 
Ex. A, R. 3567.) 
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Plaintiff never asserted that good cause existed for its belated filing, but instead 
chose to assert that its expert report was miraculously timely because Plaintiff had filed a 
motion to extend18 two days before the expert report deadline and its untimely expert 
report constituted "new evidence."19 (PL's Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Strike 
Prelim. Expert Report of Brad Townsend and the Aff. of Brad Townsend 2-6, R. 3950-
3955.) The trial court acted well within its discretion when it refused to allow this 
incredibly tardy filing and ordered Plaintiffs expert report stricken. 
Finally, as noted above, Plaintiff asserts this decision should be summarily vacated 
if the Court reverses the order granting summary judgment because it was based "at least 
in part" on the district court's grant of summary judgment. (Appellant Br. 2.) Plaintiffs 
argument fails on two levels. First, the cases cited by Plaintiff do not require the reversal 
of subsequent orders based "in part" on an earlier erroneous ruling. Rather, they stand 
for the proposition that orders made subsequent to an erroneous ruling should be reversed 
only if the later orders would not have been made but for the erroneous ruling, which is 
not the situation here. 
Plaintiff purported in its Second Motion to Extend that it needed additional 
time to review Eagle Gate College's electronic database in native format and to depose 
individuals who formerly worked for Plaintiff and subsequently worked for Eagle Gate. 
But that is belied by the reason it provided for extending the case in its First Motion to 
Extend a few months before. There it stated it needed time only to depose Todd Knecht 
and Review Ms. Miller's hard drive. Had Plaintiff truly needed the database and to 
depose any other witnesses it would have and should have included that information in 
the First Motion to Extend. It did not, thereby showing that either Plaintiff either did not 
need this evidence or was simply not diligent in its discovery.! 
19
 The only "new" evidence created by the untimely expert report was new 
evidence that Plaintiffs tactical decision not to timely file an expert report was not 
because Plaintiff lacked the ability to file an expert report. 
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For example, Plaintiff cites to McKee v. Williams, in which the trial court 
erroneously entered summary judgment declaring the plaintiff to still be a shareholder in 
a closely held corporation. 741 P.2d 978, 980-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (cited in 
Appellant Br. 19). Following that erroneous ruling, the trial court held additional 
proceedings and issued orders and judgments solely because of its erroneous ruling. Id. 
Specifically, the court entered a judgment of contempt and a penalty against the plaintiff 
for failing to provide corporate information to the defendant pursuant to Utah Code 
section 16-10-47(c). Id. at 980. In addition, the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages 
and attorney's fees. Id. Similarly, Plaintiff cites to Loporto v. Hoegemann, in which the 
trial court erroneously entered a default judgment against the wife in a divorce action. 
1999 UT App 175, U 14, 982 P.2d 586. Based on that erroneous ruling, the trial court 
awarded the husband the relief sought in his complaint, as well as attorney's fees and his 
entire retirement fund. Id. at <[ 4. Thus, when this Court reversed the entry of default 
against the wife, it also reversed the subsequent rulings. Id. at f^ 15. 
Although the trial court generally referenced its "prior rulings" as forming part of 
the bases of its decision to strike Plaintiffs expert report, and specifically referenced its 
ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, it also based its decision on the 
"grounds articulated in [the Eagle Gate Parties'] Motion to Strike" (Minute Entry 1, May 
30, 2008, Addendum Ex. D, R. 3994), which remain valid regardless of the court's prior 
rulings. Thus, unlike the subsequent rulings after the erroneous rulings in McKee and 
Loporto, the trial court's decision to strike Plaintiffs untimely expert report stands on 
its own. Even if the trial court had denied the Eagle Gate Parties' First Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, the Motion to Strike would have been well taken. Plaintiffs expert 
report was incredibly late and, regardless of the trial court's determination on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, it was well within the bounds of its broad discretion to strike 
Plaintiffs untimely expert report. 
III. Regardless of Its Decision on Summary Judgment, the Trial Court Correctly 
Excluded Evidence of Damages. 
As noted above, while the trial court's decision granting the Eagle Gate Parties' 
Motion in Limine on evidence of damages, was related "in part" to its earlier ruling on 
summary judgment, this issue is also distinct from the earlier ruling on summary 
judgment insofar as it relates to expert testimony. Regardless of the trial court's earlier 
ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert report was properly 
excluded. Therefore, expert testimony as to damages was properly excluded by the trial 
court's ruling on the Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the ruling was proper and should 
not be reversed at least as it pertains to expert testimony. 
IV. The Court Properly Granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs CFAA Claim. 
The CFAA requires that Plaintiff evidence "loss to 1 or more persons during any 
1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000" as a prerequisite to bringing a CFAA claim. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(b) and (g) (2003). Plaintiff does not dispute that the absence of 
such evidence is fatal to its CFAA claim. Yet, Plaintiff seeks to have the Court, as with 
the rulings on the Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine, summarily reverse the trial 
court's decision granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs CFAA claim because Plaintiff 
purports it was based uin part" on the earlier ruling on the First Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. (Appellant Br. 20.) Plaintiff, however, fails to even attempt to explain how 
this decision is based on or inextricably tied to the earlier decision. This is likely because 
it is not. 
In making its ruling, the trial court stated in relevant part as follows: 
In light of the Court's prior rulings, the Plaintiff cannot substantiate 
damages aggregating at least $5,000 in value and therefore cannot meet the 
statutory threshold for bring a civil action under the CFAA. Further, 
consistent with the Court's prior observations, Ms. Dewsnup's general 
testimony concerning damages is not sufficient in this regard. 
(Mem. Decision 3, Aug. 31, 2009, Addendum Ex. C, R. 4366.) Although the trial court 
did not specify which of its prior rulings it is referring to, the most reasonable inference is 
that it was referring to its ruling striking the expert report on damages, which would in 
large part preclude Plaintiff from establishing $5,000 in damages. In addition, the trial 
court found the only evidence Plaintiff cited in opposition to the Eagle Gate Parties' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the CFAA - deposition testimony of Ms. Dewsnup -
to be insufficient to establish the requisite amount of damages. (Id.) Interestingly, 
Plaintiff does not challenge that conclusion either. 
Rather, Plaintiff asks this Court, without any analysis of the underlying decision, 
the evidence presented, or the relevant controlling statute, to reverse a grant of summary 
judgment merely because of its chronological proximity to another decision. Thus, it 
says, because the First Motion for Summary Judgment preceded the Second, if the former 
is reversed, so too must be the latter. This "analysis" that court decisions are like sticks 
in a Jenga game is not supported by authority or common sense. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Faust diligently reviewed the extensive record in this case and held that 
Plaintiff had failed to substantiate its damages, that the time for doing so had passed, and 
entered summary judgment accordingly. He further held that Plaintiffs equitable claim 
under the CFAA failed, and exercised his broad discretion to order Plaintiffs extremely 
late expert report to be stricken and exclude evidence of damages at the trial of this 
matter. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or case law that warrants the reversal of 
these decisions. The Eagle Gate Parties therefore respectfully request that the Court 
affirm the trial court's rulings on each of these decisions. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 040921860 
This matter came before the Court on January 22, 2007, in connection 
with Defendants Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will refer to these parties 
herein as the "Eagle Gate Parties.7'' At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
parties' respective legal positions, their written submissions and 
counsel's oral argument. The Court should note that during the hearing, 
a representative of Eagle Gate College was permitted to speak briefly on 
the issue of what was contained in documents that were produced by the 
Eagle Gate Parties in November of 2007. While these statements provided 
helpful clarification, the Court did not rely on them in forming its 
decision on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court rules on 
that Motion as stated herein. 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
V. EAGLE GATE COLLEGE PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that the 
Plaintiff has failed to provide the basis for and a calculation 
supporting its damages claim. The Plaintiff counters that an expert 
opinion concerning damages has been delayed because the Eagle Gate 
Parties have only recently provided information necessary to compute 
damages. 
Notably, the parties agree that expert testimony is needed in order 
to establish damages in this case. Further, in reviewing the procedural 
history of this matter, which spans over four years, it is apparent that 
the Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to designate an expert on 
damages, to formulate the basis of its damages claim and to provide an 
expert report concerning the same. 
During the hearing, it became clear that the information which would 
substantiate such damages is, at least in part, in the Plaintiff's own 
possession. Further, the Court is satisfied that through discovery the 
Plaintiff has been able to glean the remaining information necessary for 
its experts to assess damages and to issue a report concerning the same. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court carefully considered, but was 
unpersuaded by the Plaintiff's theory that the information provided by 
the Eagle Gate Parties was "substantially incomplete" until the November 
supplementation. In this regard, the Plaintiff relies heavily on the 
fact that the Court previously ordered supplementation of a "lead list" 
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and spreadsheet provided by the Eagle Gate Parties, to the extent that 
this information was incomplete. To be clear, the Court determines that 
even in the absence of such supplementation, the Plaintiff had already 
been provided sufficient information for its experts to calculate 
damages. Despite this, the Plaintiff has failed to produce any 
calculations or expert reports concerning damages and all relevant 
deadlines have now passed. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff alluded to having previously sought to 
extend the deadlines in this case and indicated that the Court had not 
yet ruled on that Motion. The Plaintiff did file a Motion to Extend the 
Dates Set Forth in the Order Granting Plaintiff's to Extend Discovery 
Period on June 26, 2007. It appears that this Motion may have been 
overlooked because of the flurry of other Motions which were pending at 
that time. However, as the Court pointed out during the hearing, the 
Plaintiff has effectively had nearly six months (rather than the 60 days 
sought) to have its experts complete their expert reports on damages. 
Despite the passage of this extensive time period, the Plaintiff is 
apparently no closer to submitting an expert report than it was when the 
request for extension was filed. 
It should also be noted that the Plaintiff has requested extensions 
in the past, which the Court has previously granted. However, at this 
juncture, there is simply no excuse or justification for the Plaintiff's 
delays in providing expert reports and computations of its damages. 
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Indeed, while the Plaintiff had sufficient information to formulate the 
basis for its damages claim and to provide expert reports, even if on a 
preliminary basis, it apparently made a tactical decision not to do so. 
The Plaintiff, and not the Eagle Gate Parties, bears responsibility for 
having failed in this regard. 
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by counsel's suggestion that 
until causation could be assessed, it was impossible for the Plaintiff 
to calculate damages. The factual issues surrounding causation in this 
case are not the subject of expert testimony and would not preclude the 
Plaintiff from making the separate assessment of damages (again, even if 
on a preliminary basis). 
Overall, the Court determines that despite this late stage in the 
litigation, the Plaintiff has failed entirely to substantiate its damages 
claim. Further, the Court is simply not persuaded that the Plaintiff has 
been unable to do so because of a lack of information. The Court 
reiterates that the Plaintiff has had sufficient information to compute 
damages, but has failed to produce any calculations or expert reports to 
substantiate its damages claim and the time for doing so has now expired. 
In the absence of evidence to substantiate the damages element of the 
Plaintiff's claims, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the 
Eagle Gate Parties. 
Counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties is to prepare an Order 
consistent, but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision, indicating that 
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their Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel should include a 
procedural history detailing the information provided, extensions granted 
and the Plaintiff's failure to produce expert reports or calculations of 
damages (despite repeated requests by the Eagle Gate Parties) . 
Dated this of January, 2008. 
ROBERT P. 
DISTRICT COURT 
Oj^lA 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO 
COLLEGE, MOSESEIONGI, TREVOR 
SMITH, WALLACE ROGERS, 
RICHARD HORWITZ, STEVEN TODD 
KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON 
ITS CLAIMS AGAINST EAGLE GATE 
COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE AND 
JANA MILLER (Breach Of Contract; 
Violation Of The Uniform Trade Secret 
Act; Interference With Contractual 
Relations; Violation Of The Federal 
Computer Fraud And Abuse Act; 
Statutory Unfair Competition; And Civil 
Conspiracy) 
Case No. 040921860 
Judge Robert Faust 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College, and Jana Miller's (the "Eagle Gate Parties") Motion 
for Summary Judgment (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller) 
came on for hearing before the Court on January 22, 2008. The Eagle Gate Parties were 
represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan B. Wilcox and Jennifer R. Eshelman of Anderson 
& Karrenberg. Plaintiff was represented by Robert E. Mansfield, Scott M. Lilja and Lisa B. 
Bohman of VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court, having carefully reviewed and 
considered the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties with respect to the Motion, and 
having rendered its Memorandum Decision on January 30, 2008, hereby enters the following 
order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision dated January 30, 2008, and set 
forth in further detail below, the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiffs claims for Breach of Contract, Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, 
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and 
Civil Conspiracy are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Procedural History 
On October 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against the Eagle Gate Parties, among 
others, asserting claims for Breach of Contract,1 Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, 
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and 
The Breach of Contract Claim was only asserted against Ms. Miller. 
2 
Civil Conspiracy. (Statement of Facts ("SOF") *jfl| 1 and 2.2) For its causes of action, Plaintiff 
claimed over three years ago that it had incurred, and was therefore entitled to, damages in amounts 
"not less than" $10,250,000.00. {See Compl. pp. 27 - 30.)3 Despite the averments in its Complaint 
of damages of not less than $10,250,000.00, on November 15, 2004, Plaintiff represented in its 
Initial Disclosures that it had "not yet computed the damages it has suffered as alleged in the 
Complaint." (SOF ^ 5.) 
On November 18, 2004, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel 
requesting that in light of the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint of damages in specified minimum 
amounts and its admission that it had not computed any damages, Plaintiff either supplement its 
Initial Disclosures or amend its Complaint. (SOF \ 6.) Counsel for Plaintiff responded that 
2
 The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment cited to a "Statement of Facts." Plaintiff 
responded to facts nos. 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31, as "Undisputed" or 
"Undisputed and immaterial," and facts nos. 4, 5, 6, 14, 22, as "Undisputed but incomplete" and cited 
additional information. These facts are uncontroverted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and deemed admitted. 
3
 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that it was entitled to damages against the Eagle Gate 
Parties in the following amounts for the following claims: 
"not less than the sum of $250,000" ~ breach of contract against Ms. Miller individually {see Compl. 
p. 27); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" - violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act {see Compl. p. 
28); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" - interference with contractual relations {see id); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" -- interference with prospective economic relations {see 
Compl. p. 29); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" - violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act {see id. ); 
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000"- statutory unfair competition {see Compl. p. 30 ; and 
"not less than the sum of $5,000,000" - civil conspiracy (see jd). 
(SOFK3.) 
3 
"Plaintiff was not able to give a detailed computation of its damages at that point in the litigation." 
(Plaintiffs Responses to SOF f 6.) 
Thereafter, the Eagle Gate Parties' counsel contacted Plaintiffs counsel to request that 
Plaintiff identify the factual basis for its claim in its Complaint that it had damages in excess of 
$10,000,000.00, including the computation thereof. (SOF f 7 4) In response, Plaintiffs counsel 
represented that the computations were simply an estimate made by some of the members of 
Plaintiffs management as to the amount of Plaintiff s damages, but that there were not any specific 
documents or computations on which Plaintiff based its damages allegations in its Complaint. (SOF 
17.) 
On December 15, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel asking 
for clarification of Plaintiff s counsel's representation that "the calculation of [damages], as set 
forth in [the] Complaint, was simply a guess by some members of management as to the 
damages that [Plaintiff] may have incurred" and requesting that Plaintiff comply with its 
obligations under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (SOF ^ 8.5) 
On December 2, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties served Plaintiff with Defendants Eagle Gate 
College, Provo College, Richard Horwitz and Jana Miller's First Request for Production of 
Documents. (SOF |^ 9.) In their Requests for Production of Documents, the Eagle Gate Parties 
requested that Plaintiff produce "any and all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are 
4
 In response to SOP T| 7, Plaintiff made a statement about what it did not dispute, but failed to controvert 
any of the facts set forth therein. Thus, the facts set forth in SOP ^ | 7 are deemed admitted. 
5
 In response to Statement of Fact No. 8, Plaintiff does not dispute that the letter was sent or the content of 
the letter. 
4 
sufficient to ascertain any damages Stevens-Henager claims to have suffered as a result of any of 
the Defendant's purported misappropriation of the iead list' or other trade secrets." The Eagle Gate 
Parties further requested the production of "all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are 
sufficient to ascertain any damages Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of [the alleged actions of 
the Defendants] including, but not limited to, any computation of such alleged damages." (SOF 
lio.) 
On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff responded to each of the Eagle Gate Parties' Requests for 
Production of Documents relating to damages with a verbatim restatement of the explanation set 
forth in its Initial Disclosures: "[Plaintiff] has not yet computed the damages it has suffered . . . . To 
the extent any of these categories of damages can be quantified, [Plaintiff] will supplement these 
responses when sufficient information is available by which to make such calculations." (SOF ^ [116 
and Response thereto.) 
On July 1, 2005, the Eagle Gate Parties filed a Motion to Compel seeking an order from the 
Honorable Judge Steven Roth compelling Plaintiff to, inter alia^ (a) amend its Initial Disclosures 
to provide a damage computation and (b) appropriately respond to the Eagle Gate Parties' 
discovery requests regarding damages. {See Mot. to Compel and for Sanctions, July 1, 2005.) 
After hearing oral argument on the matter, Judge Roth ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Eagle 
Gate Parties' document requests regarding damages. {See Order Re: Mot. to Compel and for 
Sanctions, December 30, 2005.) In response to Judge Roth's Order compelling Plaintiff to 
6
 Plaintiff purported to dispute SOF H 11, but the cited evidence does not controvert it. Thus, it is 
admitted. 
5 
produce documents that support its damage claims, in early January 2006, Plaintiff produced 
documents purporting to summarize the "starts" at its various campuses from 2003 to 2005 by 
month and quarter and Quick Books print outs titled General Ledger and Trial Balance for 
Plaintiff at its various campuses. (SOF % 16.7) None of the documents produced contained any 
calculations of damages or explanation as to how the documents supported or evidenced 
Plaintiffs claim of damages in excess of $10,000,000.00. (SOF % 19.8) 
On January 12, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties again requested in writing that 
Plaintiff provide the underlying documents supporting the summaries and other documents that 
Plaintiff claimed supported its damages. (SOF % 17.9) Plaintiff, however, did not respond to the 
request by counsel. (SOF % 17.) 
On June 9, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent another letter to counsel for 
Plaintiff asking Plaintiff to confirm that there were no other documents relating to Plaintiffs 
claim of over $10,000,000.00 in damages beyond the summaries of starts and the General 
Ledgers and Trial Balances. (SOF K 18.) Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. (SOF ^ 18.10) 
On or about January 17, 2007, Jana Miller served her First Set of Interrogatories on 
Plaintiff. (SOF ^ 20). Many of Ms. Miller's Interrogatories asked Plaintiff to identify u[a]ll 
7
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the deposition testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not 
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
10
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not 
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6 
damages that [Plaintiff] claim[s] to have [or purportedly] suffered as a result of [the alleged acts 
of Ms. Miller], including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any such 
damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in computing any alleged damages." (SOF ^ 21.) 
Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the above referenced requests for information concerning the 
identification and calculation of damages by simply stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide 
information and analysis concerning the damages suffered."(SOF 11,22.) 
Similarly, on or about January 17, 2007, Eagle Gate and Provo College served their First 
Set of Interrogatories on Plaintiff. (SOF ^ 23.) Eagle Gate and Provo College's Interrogatories 
asked Plaintiff to identify "[a]U damages that [Plaintiff] purportedly suffered as a result of [the 
various alleged acts of Eagle Gate or Provo College], including a detailed statement of the 
method of the calculation of any alleged damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in 
computing any alleged damages." (SOF % 24.) Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the requests for 
information concerning damages by stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide information and 
analysis concerning the damages suffered." (SOF U 251 ].) 
In November, 2006, the parties filed a Second Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order 
and the Second Amended Scheduling Order was entered by Judge Skanchy on November 16, 
2006. The November 16, 2006 Order established a fact discovery deadline of February 28, 2007, 
and a deadline for expert witness reports of March 9, 2007. On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a 
11
 Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not 
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7 
motion to extend the discovery cutoff in the case. The basis for its request for an extension of the 
discovery cutoff was specifically stated in its Reply Memorandum as follows: 
In seeking an extension to conduct fact discovery,, Plaintiff seeks 
additional time for only two purposes. First, it seeks an extension 
to permit its experts to review the hard drive of Jana Miller...and 
to follow up on any additional discovery arising from that review. 
Second, it seeks an extension to conduct the out-of-state deposition 
of Todd Knecht, a party to this action whose whereabouts had 
previously been unknown. 
On April 18, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion and extended the pertinent deadlines by 
sixty days, establishing the new deadline for the completion of all fact discovery as June 18, 
2007, and the deadline for Plaintiff to provide any expert witness reports as June 28, 2007. 
Beyond conducting the deposition of Mr. Knecht on June 12, 2007, Plaintiff conducted no 
further discovery during the extended discovery period. 
On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses 
seeking an order compelling contact information for former employees of Plaintiff who had 
subsequently worked for either Eagle Gate College or Provo College12 and to "produce a copy of 
Eagle Gate College's database in its original format." The Motion was based, in relevant part, on 
its requests seeking "Copies of each lead list prepared, accessed, modified, or otherwise used in 
carrying out his or her responsibilities to Eagle Gate College by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht and 
Wallace Rogers" and "Documents sufficient to ascertain each and every change or alteration to 
any lead list owned, possessed, or otherwise controlled by Eagle Gate College that were made 
by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht, and Wallace Rogers." 
12
 This information was subsequently provided. 
8 
Eagle Gate and Provo College opposed the Motion, asserting that neither of the document 
requests that Plaintiff referenced requested the production of the entirety of Eagle Gate's 
database. On July 26, 2007, the Court, accordingly entered a Minute Entry ruling that because 
Plaintiff had not requested the database in discovery, the Court could not compel its production. 
The Court also noted, based on the pleadings submitted, that Eagle Gate College and Provo 
College had appropriately responded to the requests by compilipg a list of 37,000 names of 
potential students and their contact information and provided a spreadsheet identifying changes 
made to the database by Jana Miller. 
On June 20, 2007, in response to interrogatories from Plaintiff, Provo College and Eagle 
Gate College produced hard copies of spreadsheets identifying all of the "self-generated" leads 
for the individual defendants in this matter. 
On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Extend the discovery period seeking 
to extend all of the discovery deadlines and other dates by sixty days from the entry of an order 
granting the Motion to Extend. Plaintiff alleged that it required the requested extension so that it 
could review Eagle Gate College's electronic database in "native format" (a request the Court 
had already declined to compel because it had not been requested in discovery), and to depose 
individuals who formerly worked for Plaintiff who had since worked for Eagle Gate or Provo 
College—a heretofore unmentioned reason for extending discovery. Thereafter, the Plaintiff did 
not do any further discovery of the Eagle Gate Parties. 
On October 9, 2007, the Eagle Gate Parties filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 
all of Plaintiff s claims against them. In the summary judgment motions, the Eagle Gate Parties 
9 
alleged that (a) Plaintiff had failed to provide a basis for, and a calculation of, its damages claim, 
(b) Plaintiff had failed to provide any expert reports substantiating its damages (which it had 
claimed was necessary), and (c) the time for providing expert reports or expert discovery and fact 
discovery had passed. Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment alleging that it 
needed an expert witness to provide a calculation of its damages set forth in its Complaint filed 
in October 2004, and that it had been unable to provide an expert report during the preceding 
three years because the Eagle Gate Parties had only recently provided the information necessary 
for it to do so. 
It is uncontrovertible, however, that based upon what Plaintiff alleges are the categories 
of its damages, it is Plaintiff - not the Eagle Gate Parties - that possesses material information 
relating to the calculation of Plaintiff s damages. It is also undisputed that the information that 
Plaintiff alleges that it needs from the Eagle Gate Parties to compute its damages has been, at 
least in part, in Plaintiffs possession since before Plaintiff commenced this litigation. 
Specifically, in opposition to the Eagle Gate Parties' Motion, Plaintiff submitted the deposition 
testimony of Plaintiffs President, Carl Barney, in which Mr. Barney testified that Plaintiffs 
damages consisted of "[t]he loss of starts," "[t]he cost of hiring and training new people" and 
"[tjhe efforts to rebuild the admissions department." 
Plaintiffs briefing characterized its damage claim as including "an analysis of the impact 
of Defendants' breach of employment contracts on Stevens-Henager enrollment rates and the 
value of Plaintiff; and an analysis of the increased costs and decreased productivity caused by 
Defendants' poaching of Plaintiff s employees." 
10 
Plaintiff, not the Eagle Gate Parties, possesses the information necessary to calculate its 
alleged damages the loss of employees had on its enrollment rates, the cost of hiring and training 
new people, and the cost of rebuilding its admissions department. Yet, it has supplied no 
calculation or evidence regarding these damages whatsoever supporting its damages claims. 
Plaintiff indicated at the hearing that these damages were not the main damages sought by 
Plaintiff. The Court finds this troubling in light of the fact that Plaintiffs Complaint seeks 
damages in an amount "not less than the sum of $1,000,000" against the Eagle Gate Parties for 
I T 
interfering with its contractual relations with its employees. 
Even if these damages are not the main damages sought by Plaintiff, the fact remains that 
it had a duty to compute them and provide them to the Eagle Gate Parties pursuant to Rule 26 
and the Court's multiple scheduling orders and did not. Moreover, the Eagle Gate Parties 
provided Plaintiff with sufficient information for its expert(s) to calculate, even if preliminarily,14 
the other damages Plaintiff claims.15 
To allege damages in its Complaint in good faith as "not less than" sums, Plaintiff must have engaged 
in some form of computation. Indeed, Rule 11 mandates that Plaintiffs allegations must be based upon 
some reasonable inquiry or belief and have an evidentiary basis. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3); see also 
Rhineheart v. Stauffer, 638 F. 2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (before filing complaint, attorney has duty to 
"ascertain that the damages sought appear to bear a reasonable relation to injuries actually sustained"); 
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F. 2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1987) (damages alleged in prayer 
for relief "must meet the Rule 11 standard of reasonableness"). Plaintiffs repeated admission that it has 
not computed its damages is a tacit admission that the allegations of damages in its Complaint in amounts 
of "not less than" $250,000.00, $1,000,000.00, and $5,000,000.00 violate Rule 11. See Simpson v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel Co,, 522 A. 2d 880, 884 (D.C. 1987) (response to discovery request that 
answer will be supplied "as discovery continues'5 is "strong circumstantial evident" that plaintiff lacked 
basis for claims at time of filing; if plaintiffs complaint was based on any pre-filing investigation, 
plaintiff should have revealed that information in discovery). 
14
 Plaintiffs counsel indicated at the hearing of this matter that Plaintiff chose not to provide a 
preliminary analysis due to a concern that it would somehow be used against them at the trial of this 
11 
Plaintiff has failed and refused to substantiate its damages in over three years of 
litigation. Instead, Plaintiff has repeatedly stated the information would be provided through its 
expert witness report(s). The deadlines for discovery and expert witness reports have now come 
and gone four times with no expert report or computation of damages from Plaintiff. Because 
damages are an essential element of each of Plaintiff s claims against the Eagle Gate Parties, the 
Eagle Gate Parties are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff s claims against them as a matter of law. 
There is no excuse or justification for Plaintiffs failure to provide expert reports and 
computations of its damages. Accordingly, the time for Plaintiff to have substantiated its 
damages having passed, Plaintiffs claims against the Eagle Gate Parties are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED: March J6N, 2008 
BY THE COUJ 
^i *: 
Honorable Robert 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
matter. Plaintiffs tactical decision not to provide timely expert reports is not the responsibility of the 
Eagle Gate Parties and Plaintiff alone bears the responsibility for failing to do so. 
15
 Plaintiffs suggestion at the hearing that it needed additional information in order to demonstrate 
causation is also unpersuasive. The causation aspect of Plaintiffs case is not within the domain of its 
damages expert and would not preclude the Plaintiff from making an assessment of damages, even if only 
a preliminary assessment. 
12 
Approved as to form: 
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
13 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040921860 
vs. : 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, : 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 28, 2009, 
in connection with the following Motions: Defendants Eagle Gate College, 
Provo College and Jana Miller's (the "Defendants") Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Evidence of Monetary Damages, Motion in Limine to Exclude Any 
Login Tracking Lists that Purport to Show Jana Miller's Alleged Access 
of Plaintiff's Database and Related Testimony, Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Declaration of Vicky Dewsnup and Related 
Portions of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Also before the Court was the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Court took these various Motions under advisement for 
further consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties' 
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written submissions and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully 
informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties' various Motions to 
Strike are denied. The Court has noted the procedural and evidentiary 
objections advanced in these Motions, but declines to strike the matters 
at issue. Rather, the Court will consider these matters for what they 
are worth, bearing in mind the objections made. 
That brings the Court to the crux of the parties' arguments, as 
raised in their respective Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion 
for Summary Judgment. These Motions pertain to the Plaintiff's request 
for permanent injunctive relief under the following claims: (1) Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (2) interference with current and prospective 
economic relationships; (3) Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
("CFAA"); and (4) the Utah Unfair Competition Act. 
In seeking summary judgment, the Plaintiff asserts that based on the 
undisputed facts, certain of the Defendants accessed its database while 
in the scope of their employment with Eagle Gate and Provo College and 
then used this information, including lead Lists, to recruit the 
Plaintiff's employees and/or to solicit prospective students. The 
Plaintiff maintains that injunctive relief is required in order to 
prevent future incidents of the Defendants illegally accessing its 
confidential database or using information already obtained. 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
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The Defendants, in turn, seek summary judgment on the basis that the 
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief fails as matter of law because 
there is no possible threat of ongoing or future harm. With respect to 
the Plaintiff's claims under the CFAA, the Defendants argue that based 
on the Court's prior rulings concerning damages, this claim fails as a 
matter of law. The Defendants further argue that injunctive relief is 
unavailable under the Unfair Competition Act. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
agrees with the Defendants as to the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive 
relief under the CFAA. In light of the Court's prior rulings, the 
Plaintiff cannot substantiate damages aggregating at least $5,000 in 
value and therefore cannot meet the statutory threshold for bringing a 
civil action under the CFAA. Further, consistent with the Court's prior 
observations, Ms. Dewsnup's general testimony concerning damages is not 
sufficient in this regard. 
The Court also agrees with the Defendants with respect to the Unfair 
Competition Act. Reading the plain language of the Act, it does not 
appear that injunctive relief is provided for as a possible remedy under 
the Act. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under 
the CFAA and the Unfair Competition Act. 
However, with respect to the Plaintiff's remaining claims for 
injunctive relief, the Court is not convinced that the evidence clearly 
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demonstrates that these claims are moot. uThe issue of injunctive relief 
is moot when the xevents make it absolutely clear the alleged wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'" Modular Mining 
Systems, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc., 2009 WL 1162893 (Ariz. App. 
Div. 2) (quoting SAL Leasing, Inc. v. State ex. rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 
1221, 1221 (Ariz. App. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Court is not persuaded that the facts in this case make it 
"absolutely clear" that there exists no threat of future harm. Instead, 
the Court determines that this issue, as presented in this specific case, 
is factually intensive and warrants a trial on the Plaintiff's 
entitlement to injunctive relief. The record before the Court indicates 
that some level of improper access did occur previously. The mere fact 
that the employees who were involved in this activity were fired is not 
sufficient for the Court to determine that the C5i.se has necessarily been 
rendered moot, particularly where the future value of the information 
obtained remains in dispute. 
The Plaintiff's Motion likewise presents a set of factual issues, 
particularly with respect to the scope of prior access, the value of the 
information allegedly acquired, the extent of solicitation of prospective 
students based on lead lists and the quality and value of the information 
obtained for future purposes. Again, these are matters that the Court 
cannot determine summarily. 
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Notably, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants 
suggest that the Plaintiff's claims fail simply because they cannot prove 
damages (based on the Court's prior rulings). At the same time, however, 
the Defendants' Motion in Limine states that where the Plaintiff is 
merely seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages are not relevant. In 
that Motion, the Defendants correctly indicate that the Plaintiff "need 
not show monetary damages to establish the need for an injunction -
rather, it must show the opposite: that it has suffered harm that is not 
compensable by monetary damages or any other legal remedy." 
The Court agrees that with the exception of the CFAA, which brings 
the amount of damages to the forefront, the issue of damages with respect 
to the Plaintiff's remaining claims is indeed irrelevant. Therefore, 
contrary to the Defendants' argument in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Plaintiff's inability to prove monetary damages does not 
provide a basis for granting summary judgment with respect to its claims 
for injunctive relief. Rather, if the Plaintiff can meet the standard 
concerning the threat of harm, for which it does not need to introduce 
evidence of monetary damages, it can potentially succeed in its equitable 
claims. 
To summarize, the Court determines that there are a number of 
factual issues in this case which preclude the Court from determining as 
a matter of law whether or not injunctive relief is warranted in this 
case. Therefore, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
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Summary Judgment in the entirety. The Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Further, the Defendants' 
Motion in Limine regarding evidence of monetary damages is granted. 
Finally, as to the Defendants' remaining Motion in Limine, the Court 
is unwilling to entirely exclude all login tracking lists, and related 
evidence, that potentially show access of the Plaintiff's database by Ms. 
Miller. The Court is willing to consider an adverse inference as a 
potential remedy for spoliation of evidence. The scope and content of 
this adverse inference will be addressed at the time of trial. The 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude the login tracking lists is 
denied. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATfe OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040921860 
vs. : 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, : 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Defendants 
Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller seeking a ruling on 
their Motion to Strike Preliminary Expert Witness Report of Brad Townsend 
and the Affidavit of Brad Townsend. Based on the Court's prior rulings, 
including its recent ruling with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Relief From or For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary 
Judgment, and on the grounds articulated in the Defendants' Motion to 
Strike, the Court determines that this Motion is well-taken and therefore 
granted. 
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
Dated this ^ r ^ day of May, 2008. 
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DISTRICT COURT 
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Robert E. Mansfield (6272) 
Scott M.Lilja (4231) 
Lisa B. Bohman (10733) 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BULLEN & WILSON, LLC, dba EAGLE 
GATE COLLEGE; CECELIA WILSON 
dba PROVO COLLEGE; MOSESE 
IONGI; TREVOR SMITH; WALLACE 
ROGERS; RICHARD HORWITZ; 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT; JANA 
MILLER; and DOES 1 through 50; 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
JANA MILLER'S FIRST SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES 
Case No. 040921860 
Judge Faust 
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Stevens-Henager College ("SHC") 
responds to Jana Miller's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they seek to impose any 
obligation upon Plaintiff beyond the obligations imposed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they seek privileged 
material. Plaintiff construes each Interrogatory not to seek any such objectionable information. 
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3. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they require Plaintiff to 
detail all of its legal contentions and all supporting facts, on the grounds that such Interrogatories 
are premature at this stage of the litigation and would entail undue burden and expense for 
Plaintiff while discovery progresses. Subject to this objection, Plaintiff will answer the 
Interrogatories to which it is required to respond to the best of its ability, however, reserving the 
right to amend or supplement its answers, responses and objections after additional discovery has 
been conducted in this action. 
4. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they seek information or 
documents that are not relevant. 
5. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they are so vague, 
ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome and/or incomprehensible so as to render it 
infeasible to respond in any reasonable manner or in any reasonable amount of time. 
6. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they seek material or 
information that is in Defendants' possession, or is publicly available, or is otherwise available to 
Defendants. 
7. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' interrogatories because they exceed the default 
limit provided by Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of no more than 25 questions, 
including discrete subparts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 33; Advisory Committee Note for Discovery 
Rules Amendments for Rule 26; see also Nyfield v. Virgin Islands Telephone Corp., 200 F.R.D. 
246 (D.D.I. 2001) (parties cannot evade the presumptive limitation of 25 interrogatories through 
the device of joining as "subparts" questions that seek information about discrete, separate 
subjects). In the court-approved Stipulated Discovery Plan, as modified, the parties agreed, as 
provided in Rule 33, that the maximum number of interrogatories by any party to the other is 25. 
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8. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Interrogatories to the extent they request 
information that is impossible to verify or validate. 
9. Subject to the foregoing objections and to the above Reservations of Rights, 
which are incorporated into each and every answer and response made by Plaintiff to 
Defendants' discovery requests, the answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are based upon 
Plaintiffs knowledge and review of the information collected during discovery to date. Plaintiff 
reserves the right to supplement its answers to Defendants5 Interrogatories if and when additional 
responsive, non-privileged information is obtained. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
Subject to the General Objections set forth hereafter, Plaintiff hereby answers, responds 
and objects to the First Set of Interrogatories submitted by Defendant Jana Miller as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: If you claim in this matter that Jana Miller breached 
any provision of any contract between you and Mrs. Miller, identify the following: 
a. Each and every contract that you allege Mrs. Miller has breached; 
b. The precise provision(s) of any contract that you allege Mrs. Miller breached; 
c. The precise manner in which you allege Mrs. Miller breached any contract with 
you; 
d. All individuals who you allege have knowledge supporting your allegation that 
Mrs. Miller breached any contract with you, including a detailed and precise 
statement of any such individuals knowledge regarding Mrs. Miller's alleged 
breach; 
e. All documents that you allege support any allegation by you that Mrs. Miller 
breached any contract with you; and 
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f. All damages that you purported suffered as a result of any alleged breach by Mrs. 
Miller of any contract with you, including a detailed statement of the method of 
the calculation of any alleged damages and any facts you relied upon in 
computing any alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, Jana 
Miller ("Miller") signed an Employment Agreement with Stevens-Henager. The Employment 
Agreement included confidentiality, non-solicitation and non-compete clauses. Miller 
subsequently terminated her employment with Stevens-Henager and began working for Eagle 
Gate College in violation of her employment agreement. Plaintiff incorporates the Deposition 
testimony of Jana Miller, January 12, 2005, at pp. 24 - 36, in which Miller admits that she had an 
employment agreement, quit her job at Stevens-Henager, and began working for Eagle Gate. 
Miller's Employment Agreement has previously been produced. Miller, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron 
Moss, Jonathan Bullen, Larry Litchfield, Wally Rogers, and Todd Knecht have knowledge of 
Miller's breachs, as well as the involvement of Eagle Gate and its employees. Plaintiffs experts 
will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of Miller's 
breach of her employment agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: If you claim that Mrs. Miller has misappropriated 
any trade secrets as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1 et seq., then identify the following 
a. Each and every trade secret you allege Mrs. Miller misappropriated; 
b. The precise manner in which you allege Mrs. Miller misappropriated any alleged 
trade secret; 
c. All individuals who you allege have knowledge supporting your allegation that 
Mrs. Miller misappropriated any alleged trade secret, including a detailed and 
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precise statement of any such individuals knowledge regarding any alleged trade 
secret or alleged misappropriation thereof; 
d. All documents that you allege support any allegation Mrs. Miller misappropriated 
any purported trade secret; and 
e. All damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any misappropriation by 
Mrs. Miller of any alleged trade secret, including a detailed statement of the 
method of the calculation of any alleged damages and any facts you relied upon in 
computing any alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Stevens-Henager's Lead List constitutes a trade secret. Miller misappropriated trade secrets 
when she accessed Stevens-Henager's Lead List without authorization while working for Eagle 
Gate College and placed names from the Stevens-Henager list onto Defendants' Lead List. 
Persons with knowledge of Miller's unauthorized access of Plaintiff s Lead List include Miller, 
Ron Moss, Ibrahim Zulich, and Vicki Dewsnup. See generally Deposition of Ron Moss, Ibrahim 
Zulich, and Vicki Dewsnup. Responsive documents, including the Login Tracking Lists 
showing Miller's unauthorized access of Stevens-Henager's Lead List, have previously been 
produced. Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages 
suffered as a result of Miller's misappropriation of the Lead List. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify each and every purported secret or 
confidential business method, technique, information or material, including but not limited to, 
any lists, that you claim constitutes a "trade secret" and which you claim were misappropriated 
by Mrs. Miller. 
354552v2 
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RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Stevens-Henager's Lead List constitutes a trade secret. Miller misappropriated trade secrets 
when she accessed Stevens-Henager's Lead List without authorization while working for Eagle 
Gate College and transferred names from the Stevens-Henager Lead List to Eagle Gate College's 
Lead List. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: If you claim that Mrs. Miller intentionally interfered 
with existing or potential contractual, business or economic relations, identify the following: 
a. All contractual, business or economic relationships with which you claim Mrs. 
Miller interfered; 
b. The precise manner in which you allege Mrs. Miller interfered with any 
contractual, business or economic relationships; 
c. The precise means that Mrs. Miller purported used to recruit your admissions 
consultants which you claim to be improper, and the reason, if any, you claim 
those means were improper; 
d. The improper purpose that you allege was the motivation for Mr. Howitz's 
alleged interference with your existing or potential contractual, business or 
economic relations; 
e. All individuals who have knowledge supporting your allegation that Mrs. Miller 
has intentionally interfered with any contractual, business or economic relations, 
including a detailed statement of any such individuals knowledge; 
f. All documents that support any allegation by you that Mrs. Miller has 
intentionally interfered with any contractual, business, or economic relations; 
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g. All damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of any alleged interference 
by Mrs. Miller with any contractual, business, or economic relations, including a 
detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any such damages and any 
facts relied upon in computing any alleged damages, 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller interfered with employees who had employment agreements with Stevens-Henager. 
Miller also interfered with prospective students who had potential contractual, business, and 
economic relations with Stevens-Henager. Miller recruited Wally Rogers and Todd Knecht, 
Stevens-Henager employees who had employment agreements, and induced them to leave their 
positions to work for Eagle Gate. Plaintiff incorporates the Deposition of Jason Abercrombie at 
p. 90 and the Deposition of James Carr at p. 97 by reference. Miller interfered with potential 
contracts with prospective students when she accessed the Stevens-Henager database containing 
its confidential lead list and transferred names from the Stevens-Henager Lead List to 
Defendants' Lead List as evidenced by the fact that approximately 5,000 names from the 2004 
Stevens-Henager Lead List also appear on Defendants' 2004 Lead List. Miller, Vicki Dewsnup, 
Ron Moss, Jonathan Bullen, Larry Litchfield, Wally Rogers, Todd Knecht, and Ibrahim Zulich 
have knowledge of Miller's interference with potential contracts. Responsive documents, 
including the Employment Agreements, the Login Tracking Lists showing Miller's unauthorized 
access of the Stevens-Henager's database, and Stevens-Henager's Lead List have previously 
been produced. Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages 
suffered as a result of Miller's interference with contractual relations and potential contractual 
relations. 
354552v2 
7 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If you claim that Mrs. Miller violated the Federal 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), identify the following: 
a. Each section of the CFAA that allege Mrs. Miller violated; 
b. The precise manner in which you allege Mrs. Miller violated each provision of the 
CFAA that you allege she violated; 
c. Each occasion that you allege Mrs. Miller accessed your database, intentionally or 
otherwise, including, but not limited to, each occasion that you allege that 
Mrs. Miller accessed your database and altered or obliterated any contact 
information contained thereon, obtained any information of a value exceeding 
$5,000, or otherwise caused damages to you; 
d. Each occasion that you allege that Mrs. Miller knowingly caused the transmission 
of a program, information, code, or command to intentionally cause damage to 
your database; 
e. All individuals who have knowledge supporting your allegation that Mrs. Miller 
violated any provision of the CFAA, including a detailed statement of any such 
individual's knowledge; 
f. All documents that support any allegation by you that Mrs. Miller violated any 
provision of the CFAA; and 
g. All damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of any alleged violation by 
Mrs. Miller of the CFAA, including a detailed statement of the method of the 
calculation of any such damages and any facts relied upon in computing any 
alleged damages. 
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RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller violated §1030 of the CFAA when she accessed the Stevens-Henager database containing 
its confidential lead list without authorization. Miller accessed the database and Lead List, 
which is valued in excess of $5,000.00, in a manner that was unauthorized or which exceeded 
her authorization on February 11, 2004; FEB 20? March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; and April 6, 
2004. Miller, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, Jonathan Bullen, Larry Litchfield, Wally Rogers, and 
Todd Rnecht have knowledge supporting Miller's violation of the CFAA. See Dep. of Ron 
Moss, Ibrahim Zulich and Vicki Dewsnup respectively. Responsive documents, including Login 
Tracking Lists showing Miller's unauthorized access, have previously been produced. Plaintiffs 
experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of 
Miller's violation of the CFAA. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If you claim that Mrs. Miller violated the Utah 
Unfair Competition Act ("UCA"), identify the following: 
a. Each section of the UCA that allege Mrs. Miller violated; 
b. The precise manner in which you allege Mrs. Miller violated each provision of the 
UCA that you allege she violated; 
c. Each occasion that you allege Mrs. Miller participated or assisted in Eagle Gate 
College or Provo College's purported predatory hiring practices; 
d. Each occasion that you allege that Mrs. Miller engaged in cyber-terrorism as 
defined in the Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-102(2), including, but not limited to, each 
act by Mrs. Miller that you allege constituted cyber-terrorism; 
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e. All individuals who have knowledge supporting your allegation that Mrs. Miller 
violated any provision of the UCA, including a detailed statement of any such 
individual's knowledge; 
f All documents that support any allegation by you that Mrs. Miller violated any 
provision of the UCA; and 
g. All damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of any alleged violation by 
Mrs. Miller of the UCA, including a detailed statement of the method of the 
calculation of any such damages and any facts relied upon in computing any 
alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller violated the Utah Unfair Competition Act by engaging in cyber-terrorism and predatory 
hiring practices as defined in U.C.A. § 13-5a-102 through her unauthorized access of the 
Stevens-Henager Lead List and her recruiting of Stevens-Henager employees Todd Knecht and 
Wally Rogers, who had employment agreements with Stevens-Henager. Miller participated in 
and assisted Eagle Gate or Provo College in their predatory hiring practices each time she 
contacted Stevens-Henagers employee regarding potential employment at Eagle Gate College 
and each time she induced or encouraged Stevens-Henager employees to leave their positions at 
Stevens-Henager to work at Eagle Gate. Miller engaged in acts of cyber-terrorism on February 
11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; and April 6, 2004 when she accessed the Stevens-
Henager without authorization after she left Stevens-Henager employment and when she 
exceeded her authorized access. Miller, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, Jonathan Bullen, Larry 
Litchfield, Wally Rogers, and Todd Knecht has knowledge of Miller's violations of the Utah 
Unfair Competition Act. Responsive documents, including employment agreements and Login 
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Tracking Lists, have previously been produced. Plaintiffs experts will provide information and 
analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of Miller's violation of the Utah Unfair 
Competition Act. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts supporting your allegation that 
Mrs. Miller at any time conspired to induce breach of any contracts, including her own, to 
interfere with your purported existing or prospective contractual or economic relations, or to 
violate the Utah Trade Secrets Act, the CFAA, or the UCA. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller breached her own employment agreement with Stevens-Henager that included a non-
compete clause by ending her employment with Stevens-Henager and accepting employment 
with Eagle Gate in violation of her employment agreement. Once employed by Eagle Gate, 
Miller then induced Wally Rogers, Richard Horowitz and Todd Knecht, who also had 
employment agreements with Stevens-Henager, to breach their employment agreements by 
leaving Stevens-Henager and working for Eagle Gate. Miller accessed the Stevens-Henager 
Lead List on February 11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; and April 6, 2004 with the 
intent of transferring student information from the Stevens-Henager Lead List to Defendants5 
Lead List, which interfered with the prospective contractual or economic relations between 
Stevens-Henager and prospective students and which violated the Utah Trade Secrets Act, the 
CFAA, and the UCA 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State with specificity each and every damage you 
purportedly have incurred as a result of Jana Miller's use of your alead list" or any other trade 
secret as alleged in paragraph 80 of your Complaint. 
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RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a 
result of Miller's use of Stevens-Henager's Lead List. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify the basis for your allegation that Jana 
Miller "disclosed or used, and will continue to disclose or use, Stevens-Henager's ulead lists" (or 
the information contained therein) and other trade secrets without Stevens-Henager's express or 
implied consent" as alleged in paragraph 79 of your Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller accessed Plaintiffs Lead List, extracted names from the Lead List, and placed the names 
of students on Defendants' Lead List, which names continue to reside on Defendants' Lead List. 
Plaintiff has never consented to such disclosure or use of its Lead List. See also Responses to 
Interrogatories No. 2, 4, 6 and 7 above 
DATED this 7th day of May, 2007. 
VAN COTTJBAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert"]^ Mansfield 
Scott M. Lilja 
Lisa B. Bohman 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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Scott M.Lilja (4231) 
Lisa B.Bohman (10733) 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BULLEN & WILSON, LLC, dba EAGLE 
GATE COLLEGE; CECELIA WILSON 
dba PROVO COLLEGE; MOSESE 
IONGI; TREVOR SMITH; WALLACE 
ROGERS; RICHARD HORWITZ; 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT; JANA 
MILLER, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE AND 
PROVO COLLEGE'S FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
Case No. 040921860 
Judge Faust 
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Stevens-Henager College ("SHC") 
responds to Eagle Gate College and Provo College's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they seek to impose any 
obligation upon Plaintiff beyond the obligations imposed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they seek privileged 
material. Plaintiff construes each Interrogatory not to seek any such objectionable information. 
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3. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent that they require Plaintiff to 
detail all of its legal contentions and all supporting facts, on the grounds that such Interrogatories 
are premature at this stage of the litigation and would entail undue burden and expense for 
Plaintiff while discovery progresses. Subject to this objection, Plaintiff will answer the 
Interrogatories to which it is required to respond to the best of its ability, however, reserving the 
right to amend or supplement its answers, responses and objections after additional discovery has 
been conducted in this action. 
4. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they seek information or 
documents that are not relevant. 
5. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they are so vague, 
ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome and/or incomprehensible so as to render it 
infeasible to respond in any reasonable manner or in any reasonable amount of time. 
6. Plaintiff objects to these Interrogatories to the extent they seek material or 
information that is in Defendants' possession, or is publicly available, or is otherwise available to 
Defendants. 
7. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' interrogatories because they exceed the default 
limit provided by Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of no more than 25 questions, 
including discrete subparts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 33; Advisory Committee Note for Discovery 
Rules Amendments for Rule 26; see also Nyfield v. Virgin Islands Telephone Corp., 200 F.R.D. 
246 (D.D.I. 2001) (parties cannot evade the presumptive limitation of 25 interrogatories through 
the device of joining as "subparts" questions that seek information about discrete, separate 
subjects). In the court-approved Stipulated Discovery Plan, as modified, the parties agreed, as 
provided in Rule 33, that the maximum number of interrogatories by any party to the other is 25. 
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8. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Interrogatories to the extent they request 
information that is impossible to verify or validate. 
9. Subject to the foregoing objections and to the above Reservations of Rights, 
which are incorporated into each and every answer and response made by Plaintiff to 
Defendants5 discovery requests, the answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are based upon 
Plaintiffs knowledge and review of the information collected during discovery to date. Plaintiff 
reserves the right to supplement its answers to Defendants' Interrogatories if and when additional 
responsive, non-privileged information is obtained. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
Subject to the General Objections set forth hereafter, Plaintiff hereby answers, responds 
and objects to the First Set of Interrogatories submitted by Defendants Eagle Gate and Provo 
College as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or evidences your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College 
was engaged in any predatory hiring practice and for each specific fact the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the fact including 
specific statement of their purposed knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact ajid the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; and 
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d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication. 
e. All damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged predatory 
hiring practice on the part of Eagle Gate College or Provo College, including a 
detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any alleged damages and 
any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, v/hich are incorporated herein, 
Plaintiffs predatory hiring claim is based on Defendants' systematic targeting and hiring of 
Stevens-Henager employees. The following employees, the majority of whom had employment 
contracts with Stevens-Henager that included non-compete clauses, left their employment with 
Stevens-Henager and began working for Defendants: Jana Miller, Richard Horwitz, Wally 
Rogers, Todd Knecht, Tecia Orton Brinkerhoff, Rebecca Thomas Starks, Moses Iongi, and 
Trevor Smith. Responsive documents, including the employment agreements, have been 
previously produced. In addition to Defendants' employees, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, and 
Carol Gastiger have knowledge about Defendants' predatory hiring practices. Plaintiffs 
experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of 
Defendants' predatory hiring practices. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or evidences any purported acts of cyber terrorism as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-102(2) on the part of any of the Defendants in this action and for each 
such specific fact, identify the following: 
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a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the fact, including the 
specific statement of their purported knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; and 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication. 
e. All damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged predatory 
hiring practice on the part of Eagle Gate College or Provo College, including a 
detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any alleged damages and 
any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Plaintiffs claims under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-102 are based on Defendants' unauthorized 
access of the Stevens-Henager database, including its Lead List, as well as Defendants' alteration 
of Plaintiff s Lead List. 
Jana Miller (JAMiller) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization or in 
a manner that exceeded her authorization on February 11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; 
and April 6, 2004 from a computer with an IP address of 192.168.248.100. See SHC000191 -
SHC000209. 
Wally Rogers (WRogers) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on May 26, 2004 from 
an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.4. See SHC000273. 
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Todd Knecht (TOKnecht) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on March 23 2004, 
March 26, 2004, April 6, 2004, April 23, 2004, May 17, 2004, May 26, 2004 without 
authorization from an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.20 or 
205.127 92.4. See SHC000214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 236, 259. 
The IP addresses for the network at Eagle Gate College are 205.127.92.1 - 254. 
Someone used Carol Gastiger's user name (CAGastiger) to access the database on 
February 26, 2004 and March 3, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 
204.113.66.3. SeeSHC001217. 
Tecia Orton (TOrton) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization on 
March 1, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 204.113.66.3. 
The IP addresses for the network at Provo College are 204.113.66.1-254. See 
SHC001146. 
In addition to their unauthorized access of Plaintiff s database containing its Lead List, 
Defendants also altered the student information on Plaintiffs Lead List. 
Miller, Rogers, Knecht, Orton, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, and Ibrahim Zulich have 
knowledge of Defendants' acts of cyber terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-
102(2). Responsive documents have previously been identified and produced. Because of the 
predatory hiring practices, Stevens-Henager was forced to hire and train a large proportion of 
new staff, which led directly to a decrease in productivity, an increase in training costs, and a 
decrease in the number of entering students. Plaintiffs experts will provide information and 
analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of Defendants' acts of cyber terrorism. 
354557v I 
6 
-za<x 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify with specificity each and every act that you 
claim to be cyber terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-I02(2) on the part Eagle 
Gate College. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, Jana 
Miller (JAMiller) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization or in a manner 
that exceeded her authorization on February 11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; and April 
6, 2004 from a computer with an IP address of 192.168.248.100. See SHC000191 - SHC000209. 
Wally Rogers (WRogers) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on May 26, 2004 from 
an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.4. See SHC000273. 
Todd Knecht (TOKnecht) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on March 23 2004, 
March 26, 2004, April 6, 2004, April 23, 2004, May 17, 2004, May 26, 2004 without 
authorization from an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.20 or 
205.127.92.4. See SHC000214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 236, 259. 
In addition to the unauthorized access, Defendants downloaded, altered and damaged 
Plaintiffs Lead List. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify with specificity each and every act that you 
claim to be cyber-terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-102(2) on the part of Provo 
College. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Tecia Orton (TOrton) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization on March 1, 
2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 204.113.66.3. Someone from Provo 
College, believed to be Tecia Orton, used Carol Gastiger's user name (CAGastiger) to access the 
database on February 26, 2004 and March 3, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP 
7 
354557v. I 
Address of 204.113.66.3. See SHC001217. The IP addresses for the network at Provo College 
are 204.113.66.1-254. See SHC001146. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify with specificity each and every act that you 
claim to be cyber-terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-102(2) on the part of 
Richard Horwitz. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, after 
extensive discovery, Plaintiff no longer maintains that Richard Horwitz engaged in any act of 
cyber-terrorism. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify with specificity each and every act that you 
claim to be cyber-terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-102(2) on the part of Jana 
Miller. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Miller accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization or in a manner that 
exceeded her authorization on February 11, 2004, March 9, 2004, March 27, 2004, and April 6, 
2004. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify each and every unauthorized act as to any 
of your computers, computer databases, networks, or electronic or magnetic storage or backups 
of data or information that occurred between January 1, 1998, and the present, and for each such 
unauthorized access, identify the following: 
a. the precise date on which the alleged unauthorized access occurred; 
b. the individual(s) who purportedly engaged in the unauthorized access, or that you 
suspect to have engaged in the unauthorized access, including the basis for your 
claim that the individual(s) engaged in the unauthorized access; 
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c. all user names, including all passwords for each such user, that you claim were 
used for the unauthorized access; 
d. if you claim that any unauthorized access was encouraged or solicited by someone 
other than the individual who engaged the unauthorized access, identify each and 
every fact that support such allegation in the individual(s) that allegedly 
encouraged or solicited the unauthorized access; 
e. each and every internet provider address used in any unauthorized access and, if 
you believe that the individual(s) engaged in the unauthorized access are spoofing 
their internet provider address, state the basis for your belief that the internet 
provider address is a spoof; 
f. each and every document the refers or relates to, evidences, or documents that had 
unauthorized access; and 
g. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the unauthorized access 
including specific statement of their purported knowledge. 
h. All damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged unauthorized 
access, including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any 
alleged damages and any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged 
damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, Jana 
Miller (JAMiller) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization or in a manner 
that exceeded her authorization on February 11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; and April 
6, 2004 from a computer with an IP address of 192.168.248.100. S^e SHC000191 - SHC000209. 
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Wally Rogers (WRogers) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on May 26, 2004 from 
an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.4. See SHC000273. 
Todd Knecht (TOKnecht) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on March 23 2004, 
March 26, 2004, April 6, 2004, April 23, 2004, May 17, 2004, May 26, 2004 without 
authorization from an Eagle Gate College computer with an LP address of 205.127.92.20 or 
205.127.92.4. See SHC000214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 236, 259. 
The IP addresses for the network at Eagle Gate College is 205.127.92.1 - 254. 
Someone used Carol Gastiger's user name (CAGastiger) to access the database on 
February 26, 2004 and March 3, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 
204.113.66.3. SeeSHC001217. 
Tecia Orton (TOrton) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization on 
March 1, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 204.113.66.3. 
The IP addresses for the network at Provo College ctre: 204.113.66.1-254. See 
SHC001146. 
In addition to their unauthorized access of Plaintiffs database containing its Lead List, 
Defendants also downloaded and altered the student information on the Lead List. 
Miller, Rogers, Knecht, Orton, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, and Ibrahim Zulich have 
knowledge of Defendants' acts of cyber terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-
102(2). Responsive documents have previously been identified and produced. Defendants' acts 
of cyber terrorism have caused damage to Plaintiffs ongoing retention and recruiting of students 
and have damaged the value of plaintiff as a business. Plaintiffs experts will provide 
information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of Defendants' acts of 
cyber terrorism. 
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Defendants' passwords were confidential. As a result, Plaintiff cannot provide the 
passwords for the individuals who accessed its database without authorization. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or evidences, your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College 
engaged in any action in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and for each such fact, 
identify the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about he fact including specific 
statement of their purported knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; and 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identifies of each party to the communication. 
e. All damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged violation of 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by Eagle Gate College or Provo College, including 
a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any alleged damages and 
any facts you relied upon in co putting any alleged damages; 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated 
herein, Jana Miller (JAMiller) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization or in 
a manner that exceeded her authorization on February 11, 2004; March 9, 2004; March 27, 2004; 
354557v 1 
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and April 6, 2004 from a computer with an IP address of 192.168.248.100. See SHC000191 -
SHC000209. 
Wally Rogers (WRogers) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on May 26, 2004 from 
an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.4. See SHC000273. 
Todd Knecht (TOKnecht) accessed the Stevens-Henager database on March 23 2004, 
March 26, 2004, April 6, 2004, April 23, 2004, May 17, 2004, May 26, 2004 without 
authorization from an Eagle Gate College computer with an IP address of 205.127.92.20 or 
205.127.92.4. See SHC000214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 236, 259. 
The IP addresses for the network at Eagle Gate College is 205.127.92.1 - 254. 
Someone used Carol Gastigef s user name (CAGastiger) to access the database on 
February 26, 2004 and March 3, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 
204.113.66.3. SeeSHC001217. 
Tecia Orton (TOrton) accessed the Stevens-Henager database without authorization on 
March 1, 2004 from a Provo College computer with an IP Address of 204.113.66.3. 
The IP addresses for the network at Provo College are: 204.113.66.1-254. See 
SHC001146. 
In addition to their unauthorized access of Plaintiffs database containing its Lead List, 
Defendants also downloaded and altered the student information on the Lead List. 
Miller, Rogers, Knecht, Orton, Vicki Dewsnup, Ron Moss, and Ibrahim Zulich have 
knowledge of Defendants' acts of cyber terrorism as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5(a)-
102(2). Responsive documents have previously been identified and produced. Defendants' 
violations of the Trade Secrets Act have caused damage to Plaintiffs ongoing retention and 
recruiting of students and have damaged the value of plaintiff as a business. Plaintiffs experts 
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will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of Defendants5 
Defendants' violations of the Trade Secrets Act 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College interfered 
with any reported contractual relations as alleged in your Complaint and for each specific fact, 
identify the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the fact including 
specific statement of their purported knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication; 
e. each and every act that you claim was engaged in by Eagle Gate College or Provo 
College that interfered with any contractual relations; 
f. each and every contractual relation that you claim was interfered by Eagle Gate 
College or Provo College; 
g. each and every contractual relation that you claim was breached as a result of any 
purported interference by Eagle Gate College or Provo College; 
h. with respect to each purported breach, the specific facts that you claim constituted 
a breach; 
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i. each and every fact that you claim supports an allegation that Eagle Gate College 
or Provo College in any way caused, encouraged, or induced, the breach; and 
j . all damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged interference 
with reported contractual relations on the part of Eagle Gate College or Provo 
College, including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any 
alleged damages and any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged 
damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, see 
Responses to Interrogatories Nos. land 8 above and 10 below. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates, or evidences your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College 
interfered with any reported prospective economic relations as alleged in your Complaint and for 
each specific fact, identify the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about he fact including specific 
statement of their purported knowledge; 
b* each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication; 
354557v 1 
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e. each and every act that you claim was engaged in by Eagle Gate College or Provo 
College that interfered with any prospective economic relations; 
f. each and every prospective economic relations that you claim was interfered by 
Eagle Gate College or Provo College; 
g. each and every prospective economic relations that you claim was beached as a 
result of any purported interference by Eagle Gate College or Provo College; 
h. with respect to each purported breach, the specific facts that you claim constituted 
a breach; 
i. each and every fact that you claim supports an allegation that Eagle Gate College 
or Provo College in any way caused, encouraged, or induced, the breach; and 
j . all damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged interference 
with reported prospective contractual relations on the part of Eagle Gate College 
or Provo College, including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation 
of any alleged damages and any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged 
damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Defendants altered student contact information on Plaintiffs Lead List, making it difficult or 
impossible to contact potential students. Defendants transferred names and information from 
Plaintiffs Lead List to Defendants' Lead List, resulting in the duplication of over 5,000 student 
names. Defendants also interfered with Stevens-Henager's ability to lease downtown space and 
with Plaintiffs creation of a Polynesian program by usurping those opportunities. Plaintiffs 
experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a result of 
354557v.l 
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Defendants5 interference with reported prospective contractual relations on the part of 
Defendants. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or evidences your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College 
engaged in any action in violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 
1030), and for each such fact, identify the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the fact including 
specific statement of their purported knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; and 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication; 
e. each and every fact that supports your allegation in your Complaint that any of the 
Defendants in this matter accessed your database with the intent to defraud; 
f. each and every fact that supports your allegation that Miller, Eagle Gate College, 
or Provo College obtained any information of value exceeding $5,000; and 
g. each and every fact that supports your allegation that Miller, Eagle Gate College, 
or Provo College not only caused a transmission that intentionally caused damage 
to your database m an amount in excess of $5,000. 
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RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, see 
Responses to Interrogatories Nos. 2 - 8 above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify with specificity each and every fact that 
supports, refers or relates to, or evidences your claim that Eagle Gate College or Provo College 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to drive you out of business or cripple your business, and for each 
such fact, identify the following: 
a. each and every individual who has any knowledge about the fact including 
specific statement of their purported knowledge; 
b. each and every document that refers or relates to or evidences the fact, including 
the custodian of the documents, the author, and all recipients of the document; 
c. the date of which you became aware of each fact and the precise method by which 
you became aware of the fact; and 
d. each and every communication that relates or refers in any way to the fact and all 
documents that relate or refer to or evidence any such communication, and the 
identities of each party to the communication. 
e. all damages that you purportedly suffered as a result of any alleged engagement in 
a civil conspiracy on the part of Eagle Gate College or Provo College, including a 
detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any alleged damages and 
any facts you relied upon in computing any alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Defendants conspired to damage Plaintiff through the following: by targeting its employees and 
inducing them to leave Stevens-Henager; by accessing Plaintiffs Lead List and transferring 
names to Defendants5 Lead List; by altering and damaging Plaintiffs Lead List; and by ensuring 
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that Plaintiffs could not occupy leased space. Defendants stated their intent to put Plaintiff out 
of business. The Deposition of James Carr at p. 101 - 103 and the deposition of Jason 
Abercrombie at p. 30 are incorporated by reference. Defendants, Ron Moss, Vicki Dewsnup, 
Carol Gastiger, Carl Barney, Jason Abercrombie, and Jason Carr have knowledge of Defendants' 
conspiracy. Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages 
suffered as a result of Defendants' civil conspiracy. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify and state the factual basis for your 
allegation in paragraph 40 of your Complaint that Iongi and Smith both began working at Eagle 
Gate College and began efforts to recruit away from Stevens-Henager the very prospects that 
Stevens-Henager had paid them to pursue. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Statements made to Ron Moss by Pakineti Ngatuvai and Tonga Tuha, which statements are 
contained in documents previously produced to Defendants. In addition, Plaintiff incorporates 
the deposition testimony of Jonathan Bullen by reference in which he states that "they were 
soliciting students in our behalf, in our name . . ." Deposition of Jonathan Bullen, March 4, 
2005, at p. 19,1. 12 -18 . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: State with specificity each and every damage you 
purportedly have incurred as a result of Eagle Gate College's use of your "lead list" or any other 
trade secret as alleged in paragraph 80 of your Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, 
Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a 
result of Eagle Gate College's use of Plaintiff s Lead List. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 15: State with specificity each and every damage you 
purportedly have incurred as a result of Provo College's use of your "lead list" or any other trade 
secret as alleged in paragraph 80 of your Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, . 
Plaintiffs experts will provide information and analysis concerning the damages suffered as a 
result of Provo College's use of Plaintiff s Lead List. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify the basis for your allegation that Provo 
College has "disclosed or used, and will continue to disclose or use, Stevens-Henager's 'lead 
lists' (or the information contained therein) and other trade secrets without Steven-Henager's 
express or implied consent" as alleged in paragraph 79 of your Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, see 
Responses to Interrogatories No. 2 - 8 above. In addition, Defendants copied names from 
Stevens-Henager's Lead List to Defendants' Lead List as evidenced by the fact that Defendants' 
2004 Lead List contains 5,000 names that are on Plaintiffs 2004 Lead List that were used to 
contact prospective students. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify the basis for your allegation that Eagle Gate 
College has "disclosed or used, and will continue to disclose or use, Stevens-Henager's "lead 
lists" (or the information contained therein) and other trade secrets without Steven-Henager's 
express or implied consent" as alleged in paragraph 79 of your Complaint. 
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RESPONSE: Subject to the objections stated above, which are incorporated herein, see 
Response to Interrogatory No. 16 above. 
DATED this J_ day of May, 2007. 
354557v 1 
20 
'Znfi 
rab& 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040921860 
vs. : 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, : 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it several requests for decision in connection 
with the following Motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants' 
Discovery Responses; Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that 
Provo College, Eagle Gate College and Jana Miller did not Engage in 
Predatory Hiring Practices in Violation of the Unfair Competition Act and 
Defendant Richard Horwitz's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's 
Claim Against Richard Horwitz. The Court notes that a request for 
hearing has been made with respect to these Motions. However, the Court 
is satisfied that the parties' written submissions adequately apprise the 
Court of their respective legal positions and that a hearing on these 
Motions is not necessary. Therefore, having reviewed the moving and 
responding memoranda concerning each of these Motions, the Court rules 
as stated herein. 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
V. EAGLE GATE COLLEGE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel: 
In its Motion to Compel, the Plaintiff is seeking access to the 
Defendants' database for the purpose of assessing modifications that may 
have been made to the Defendants' "lead list." In Request Nos. 33 and 
34 of the Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents 
to Eagle Gate College ("Eagle Gate"), the Plaintiff requested copies of 
Eagle Gate's lead list and any documentation concerning modifications to 
the lead list. 
The Defendants correctly observe that these Requests did not 
specifically seek the production of the entirety of Eagle Gate's and 
Provo College's databases. Since the Plaintiff did not request the 
database (s) in discovery, the Court cannot compel the Defendants to 
produce a copy of such database(s) as part of a Motion to Compel. 
However, it does appear that while the Defendants do not maintain 
a document known as a "lead list," they responded to Request Nos. 33 and 
34 by compiling a list of 37,000 names of potential students and their 
contact information. The Defendants also provided a spreadsheet which 
apparently identified the changes to the database by Defendant Jana 
Miller. 
To the extent that this information is incomplete, as discussed in 
the Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum, the Court directs counsel for the 
Defendants to supplement the "lead list" and the spreadsheet previously 
provided. For instance, it appears that the spreadsheet pertaining to 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
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Ms. Miller does not clearly identify the connection between Ms. Miller 
and potential leads. 
Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, but 
directs the Defendants to supplement the information they have already 
provided in a manner that addresses the Plaintiff's concerns, as outlined 
in its Reply Memorandum. It may be prudent for counsel to meet and to 
confer regarding this supplementation. In doing so, the Plaintiff should 
be cognizant of the fact that the Defendants were not required to create 
the list and spreadsheet discussed above. It appears that these 
documents were compiled in an effort to be cooperative. It should be in 
that spirit that the Plaintiff requests further supplementation of these 
documents. The Court further rules the Motion to Strike Defendants' 
Reply on the Motion to Compel Discovery is moot+ 
Defendant Horwitz's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Without restating the parties' contentions, the Court rules that 
Defendant Horwitz's Motion is well-taken and therefore granted. 
Specifically, with respect to the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim 
against Defendant Horwitz, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has 
failed to provide any evidence of damages relative to Defendant Horwitz's 
conduct. Indeed, while the Plaintiff contends that it suffered damage 
from the loss of staff at its Ogden campus, tnere are no facts before 
this Court which would connect Defendant Horwitz: to this loss or 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE 
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otherwise substantiate that Defendant Horwitz's alleged breach caused the 
Plaintiff any harm. 
Further, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has failed to 
present any evidence which would support a civil conspiracy claim against 
Defendant Horwitz. The mere fact that Defendant Horwitz was fired is not 
sufficient evidence of his alleged participation in a conspiracy. As 
Defendant Horwitz's Motion points out, there is no evidence that he did 
anything other than accept a job at Eagle Gate College after being fired 
by the Plaintiff. Further, Defendant Horwitz's mere association with the 
remaining Defendants, who allegedly conspired to drive the Plaintiff out 
of business, without more, is not enough to establish that he actually 
had a meeting of the minds with these other individuals as to a common 
purpose or objective. 
Finally, the Court notes that the Plaintiff has acknowledged that 
Defendant Horwitz is entitled to summary judgment as to its sixth, 
seventh and eighth causes of action. Therefore, in light of this 
acknowledgment and based on the Court's ruling herein, Defendant Horwitz 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Predatory Hiring 
Practices 
The Defendants' Motion raises the issue of what is meant by the term 
"predatory hiring practices," as used in the Utah Unfair Competition Act 
("the Act"), Utah Code Ann., §§ 13-5a-102 et. seg. Specifically, the 
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Plaintiff contends that the Defendants have engaged in "predatory hiring 
practices" under the Act by hiring its trained, experienced employees to 
perform the same or similar tasks at Eagle Gate and Provo Colleges. 
According to the Plaintiff, this upoaching" of its employees qualifies 
as a "predatory hiring practice." The Defendants disagree with this 
interpretation and contend the term "predatory hiring practices" does not 
include hiring a competitor's employees and then utilizing them in the 
marketplace. 
The Court determines that the term "predatory hiring practices" is 
a term of art which can be construed by looking both to interpretive case 
law and legislative history. In this regard, the Court has carefully 
considered the legislative history of the term by reviewing the exchange 
between Representatives Hogue and Urquhart (as discussed in the 
Defendants' memoranda) . In addition, while it does not appear that Utah 
courts have interpreted the term "predatory hiring practices," there are 
a number of federal cases which discuss the term in the context of the 
Sherman Act. 
Based on the Court's independent legal research, it appears that the 
interpretation of the term "predatory hiring practices" begins with the 
acknowledgment that both under the Act and under the federal case law, 
the hiring of one employee is insufficient to establish such practices. 
Rather, consistent with the Plaintiff's interpretation, it appears that 
the "predator" must be engaged in a pattern of hiring "en masse." 
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At this point, the federal case law diverges from the Plaintiff's 
position as to what constitutes predatory hiring practices. Under the 
cases examined by the Court, talented employees are lured away not for 
the purpose of using their talent, but rather for the purpose of denying 
that talent to the competitor. Indeed, this is the hallmark of predatory 
hiring: The competitor is harmed, without truly helping the upredator." 
Recalling that the Plaintiff's allegations are centered on the 
Defendants hiring its trained, experienced employees to perform the same 
or similar tasks at Eagle Gate and Provo Colleges, it would appear that 
these practices would not constitute predatory hiring practices, as that 
term is defined under the federal case law. This conclusion seems to 
compel summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
However, before the Court reaches a definitive decision on this 
point, the Court would like to give both parties an opportunity to 
further advise the Court about whether it ought to utilize the federal 
interpretation of the term "predatory hiring practices,'' as established 
in the context of the Sherman Act. As the Plaintiff points out, the 
Sherman Act has a distinct statutory scheme which may make its 
interpretation of this term inapplicable. Further, the Court would like 
counsel to conduct further research into case law interpreting statutory 
schemes more closely aligned to the Act and the use of the term 
"predatory hiring practices" in that context. 
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Counsel should submit supplemental briefs to the attention of the 
Court's attorney law clerk, Alexandra Doctorman, within 10 days of this 
Minute Entry decision. The Court will then render a final ruling on the 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to predatory hiring 
practices. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and granting Defendant Horwitz's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Dated this day of July, 2007. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE * 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
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THE COURT: ... Thank you. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Thomas Karrenberg, Nathan Wilcox 
and Jennifer Eshelman for the defendants, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Just a comment. Do we need to argue that motion 
involving Ms. Miller? I guess if you didn't oppose it, 
I'm -
MR. KARRENBERG: Well, Counsel was kind enough to 
send us a letter that said "We will stipulate that Stevens 
Henager is not bringing a claim against Ms. Miller solely 
based on the acceptance of the employment with Eagle Gate 
College, and, accordingly, no further briefing on 
defendant's partial motion for summary judgment," et cetera, 
is necessary. So I think we can grant that motion, Judge. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah. And I guess our point, 
Judge, is we didn't assert a claim for that, so that's why 
we didn't oppose it. 
THE COURT: That's fine. All right. I'll go 
ahead and grant that motion then. And just help the court 
clerks out next time. If you would just drop us a note 
you're not opposing a motion. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Oh, certainly, Judge. 
THE COURT: Here's why, is when we get the notices 
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to submit, they start looking for the memos, the replies and 
responses, and we're skipping something and so we don't know 
if we missed it and not filed it — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Absolutely, Judge. 
THE COURT: - and we've got it, or if we never 
received it. So that would help us on our end. 
All right. Thank you. 
All right, Mr. Karrenberg, I guess that leaves us 
with your motion on summary judgment on the claims. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Yes, sir. Thank you, Your Honor. 
Judge, we're now into the fourth year of this 
litigation. The case was filed in October of 2004, and we 
still don't have the most rudimentary idea of what are the 
amount of damages the plaintiff is claiming to have 
suffered, even though, in the complaint, the plaintiff 
alleges damages of over $10 million, enough where, 
obviously, it's time to take this kind of a case seriously. 
The complaint, as I indicated, was filed in 
October of 2004. Since then, we have done everything 
possible to obtain this damage information. In the initial 
disclosures, the plaintiff said they had not yet computed 
damages. And, Judge, that's despite the requirement that 
the plaintiff must have done some form of computation to 
allege damages in the complaint. 
If you'll notice in our memo at footnote 1 on page 
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2, we cited the cases that says that could even be a Rule 11 
violation, or at least evidence of a Rule 11 violation. 
Now, we haven't moved for any Rule 11, but it's clear that, 
with Rule 26, you're supposed to do some sort of calculation 
beforehand. In fact, because of that, after we got the Rule 
26 disclosures, which were dated November 15th, 2004, we 
immediately sent a letter asking — dated November 18th, 
2004, asking the plaintiff to either supplement those 
disclosures or amend the complaint. And that began a long 
history of trying to ascertain what are the damages the 
plaintiff claims? 
Now, we've set forth in detail in the Statement of 
Facts all the discovery, the interrogatories, the document 
requests, the 3 0(b)(6) letters and even the motions we've 
gone through to try and find out what is the number that 
plaintiff is claiming in connection With the various causes 
of action. In fact, all of it's been done without success. 
Now, after the motion to compel, the only 
documents we received, Judge — these are attorneys eyes 
only — were two pages of charts like this showing the 
supposed number of starts at their various campuses, which 
is — there's a second page of that, which doesn't tell me 
anything as far as damages. And we did get from the various 
campuses a general ledger. It looks like a QuickBooks. 
THE COURT: What is shown on the general ledger? 
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Just what type of information, so I'm aware of it. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, a bill payment or a check, 
general journal check amounts, total cash in the bank 
accounts, school deposits, bank transfers. It's — 
THE COURT: General ledger. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, it almost looks like my 
checkbook, except there's a lot more money there. 
But it doesn't give us any damage calculation 
whatsoever. And we asked in another letter, and counsel 
says they don't have to respond to letters, and that's, you 
know, technically, that's true. But we've all been doing 
this business for a long time and, rather than making a lot 
of motions, it's usually a lot easier to try and resolve 
situations and write to people. 
So we asked in a letter to confirm that these are 
the only documents they had in damages. That letter was not 
responded to. 
And, as I've indicated, notably, these documents, 
no matter what the information is on them, does not have any 
calculation of damages. 
Thereafter, we served the interrogatories and 
specifically asked for the — the information concerning 
damages. And in a response, we were told we'd be referred 
to experts. 
The problem is, Judge, the deadline in this case 
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for filing experts' reports was June 2 8th, 2007, and we 
received nothing. Now, they claim we didn't file anything. 
But, Judge, opposition expert reports were due on July 20th, 
and since we didn't have anything, we don't have an 
opposition because we don't even know what to do. 
The time has past, Judge, and so we move the 
summary judgment motion. And the summary judgment motion is 
based on their inadequacies of their documents and their 
deposition testimony, where they cannot calculate the 
damages with any degree of specificity. That's competent 
evidence and it's unrebutted. There is no Rule 56(f) motion 
satisfying the requirements of Rule 56(f) saying that we 
need further discovery before this could be done. There is 
no affidavit from an expert saying, because I'm missing this 
kind of information and, therefore, I can't do a calculation 
of damages," there's not even an affidavit from a non-expert 
contesting the facts. All we have, even though this is a 
Rule 56(f) motion, all we have is argument from the counsel, 
and that's not how Rule 56(f) is supposed to work. 
Now, they claim they don't have — 
THE COURT: Well, we have the testimony of their 
client in a deposition as well. 
MR. KARRENBERG: I'm going to get to that, Your 
Honor. I plan to do that in about two seconds here. 
They claim they don't have information from us. 
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1 Well, Judge, to be perfectly honest, that's nonsense. They 
2 said they need the original databases for the lead list. We 
3 provided them — and they have this; the database and the 
4 lead list. The only thing different, we maintain it on a 
5 program called CampusView, which they could not manipulate. 
6 And as the affidavit we've submitted of Rachel Johnson 
7 shows, the only thing that happened was she transported it, 
8 the entire database to an Excel spreadsheet for the simple 
9 reason that would allow plaintiffs to search it and also 
10 manipulate it. 
11 If we put it in the original database, it would 
12 just be a picture. And the only way they'd be doing it is 
13 by hand. This allowed them to do it. But the information 
14 is exactly the same, it's just been transported from 
15 basically a proprietary system that they don't have access 
16 to to a normal Excel spreadsheet so they can look at it. 
17 That's uncontroverted. If we hadn't done that, we'd be here 
18 hearing how we gave them the information but they can't do 
19 anything with it and they're forced to sit down late at 
20 night with their green visors on and pencils comparing 
21 names. 
22 THE COURT: Did you advise them that you were 
23 changing the format of the information so they could find 
24 it, that was being shipped over to them? 
25 MR. KARRENBERG: I don't believe so, Judge. But 
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it's — but it's the complete information. And there's no 
affidavit from anybody saying, "I can't use this." None. 
Now, raising about the — the testimony of 
Mr. Barney — and I think that's important because it's 
actually in page 2 of the reply memo - the response 
memorandum. Carl Barney, owner of Stevens Henager, placed 
the damages incurred by Stevens Henager at approximately $10 
million, based on his experience. Plaintiff's decline in 
enrollment, cost of hiring and training new employees, cost 
of building plaintiffs' admission department. 
And then they even write, the last sentence of 
that paragraph: "A more definitive calculation will be 
provided by plaintiffs' experts." Well, Judge, let's go 
through it. 
Decline in enrollment. That's all within their 
knowledge, Judge. They know what their decline in 
enrollment is. I don't. And there's no information I have 
or my client has that's going to shed any light on the 
decline — their decline in enrollment. 
The cost in hiring and training new employees. 
That's the second item. There's no information my client 
has that's going to allow them to figure out their costs for 
training and hiring new employees. 
The last category, the cost of rebuilding 
plaintiffs' admission department. The same thing, Your 
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Honor. We will not have and do not have any information 
that can do that. Yet, that's what they're relying on. 
Now, how do you make the leap that they didn't have time in 
the three years — almost three years when the case was 
started to hire an expert or an accountant or even an 
internal bookkeeper to make those calculations? The reports 
were due in June of '07. The case was filed in October of 
2004. The decline in enrollment? They can tell me what it 
is and how much they think is our fault. 
Two, cost of hiring new employees? I didn't pay 
for it. I don't have anything to do with that. 
Same thing with building their new admissions 
department. There's no way you logically can jump from that 
category of damages to saying, "I need an expert." And, 
again, Your Honor, there is no affidavit from anybody, or a 
Rule 56 motion, saying that they cannot calculate those 
categories of Mr. Barney identified without some additional 
information. Nothing. We just have statements in a 
memorandum. 
Now, Judge, as I indicated, the case originally 
started with a $10 million claim. Excess of ten million. 
That's a serious amount to be asking for in any business. 
More importantly, Your Honor, that's a serious amount for a 
company to really have lost, if it's true. I don't know of 
too many companies in this community that could withstand a 
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$10 million hit and still be in business four years later. 
I guess Citibank, with the way they've been writing off and 
stuff lately, can afford a lot more. But that's not what 
we're dealing with here. 
So what does that tell me? Obviously, this case 
has been designed as some sort of competitive tool, Judge. 
And it's been extended on the basis of some sort of 
competitive tool. Except litigation is not intended to be a 
competitive tool. We come in here in good faith, if we 
think our client's rights have been breached, and prove up 
our damages. 
They've had enough time. The scheduling order is 
clear. They haven't come up with any damages. It's a Rule 
56 motion which requires them to dispute the facts with 
evidence. There is none in the case. 
Your Honor, I submit that this motion should be 
granted. Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Morning, Judge. 
THE COURT: Morning. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Please the Court and counsel. 
Your Honor, as Mr. Karrenberg mentioned, one 
motion — or as Your Honor has noted, the one matter, motion 
for summary judgment, has been taken care of; we're now 
talking about the motion for summary judgment on damages. 
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Defendants have asserted that summary judgment 
should be granted in their favor on all causes of action set 
forth in plaintiff's complaint inasmuch as Stevens Henager 
has not established it's damages. And defendants attempt to 
make a big deal out of the fact, Judge, that we alleged our 
damages in our complaint but can't come up with a specific 
calculation. As Mr. Karrenberg pointed out, they requested 
it first in November, just a couple of months, a month after 
the complaint was filed. 
This is a typical practice, Judge. You allege 
what you, in good faith, believe your damages are. We did 
that. We alleged that in our complaint. And this is not a 
new issue they're bringing before the Court. 
Previously, defendants filed a motion to compel on 
our initial disclosures before Your Honor was assigned the 
case, with Judge Roth, making the exact same arguments. Our 
initial disclosures didn't set forth the specified amount of 
damages. We made these allegations in the complaint, and we 
shouldn't be compelled to amend our initial disclosures. 
Judge Roth rejected that argument and denied that motion. 
And that was in June of 2 005, Judge. 
Now, this is the type of case, Judge, where 
damages are going to be difficult to determine. And this is 
exactly the kind of case contemplated by Rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, where an expert is necessary. 
12 
There's a great deal of economic analysis that needs to go 
on, such as the — you know, one of our big issues is the 
decline in enrollment. The damages relate — you know, in 
order to get damages, you have to show causation, Judge. 
And a lot of the documents that they have that we've been 
seeking, this lead list and the spreadsheet regarding the 
lead list, are absolutely instrumental in determining the 
decline of enrollment and the causation between what we're 
calling our decline and the damages associated with that. 
And we have my affidavit that we've attached to our 
opposition to their motion for summary judgment stating 
that. 
Now, they didn't just voluntarily produce these 
documents, as Mr. Karrenberg said. We had to file a motion 
to compel to get those documents. They opposed the motion 
to compel. It was granted by this court on July 26th. We 
didn't get the documents until after we filed our opposition 
to this memorandum. That wasn't until November, just a few 
months ago, Judge. That's when we first got the documents 
we were requesting. And that's what's necessary in order to 
complete our damage calculation. 
It's grossly unfair for defendants to set up a 
situation where we can only fail because they're holding 
back documents that we need for this damage calculation, and 
then jump and say, "Oh, well, you didn't get us your expert 
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report so, therefore, summary judgment should be granted." 
Now, we've continuously told defendants throughout 
this litigation what the basis of our claims for damages 
are. They know what those are. They've asked them in 
depositions, in the depositions of Mr. Barney, Ms. Gastigar, 
Mr. Moss, of Ms. Dewsnup. Those three are campus 
presidents; Mr. Barney's the owner of Stevens Henager 
College. 
We've responded to it in interrogatories. We've 
produced every document we have. They have everything — 
every accounting document down to the most rudimentary of 
the accounting documents that they need and on which our 
experts will rely. 
This has been a hard-fought case, Judge. A lot of 
money's at stake here, as Mr. Karrenberg said. Even as late 
as two days ago, we get an email from counsel for defendants 
responding to our request for a supplementation on their 
financial records, saying they'll get it to us in the next 
couple of weeks. We're still getting documents produced to 
us, Judge. That's still ongoing in this case. 
We've also — when we filed prior — as 
Mr. Karrenberg pointed out — the discovery order required 
that expert reports be filed by June 28th. On June 26th, 
two days before then, when defendants wouldn't stipulate, we 
filed a motion with this court to extend the dates and to 
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enter a new scheduling order. That motion has been fully 
briefed and has been noticed — has been submitted for 
decision before this Court, and we would like a ruling on 
that. That notice to submit, I believe, was filed in July 
of this year. And we need that scheduling order so we can 
complete this case, Judge. This case does need to get over. 
This is not a case that's being used — litigation is not 
being used as a competitive advantage and tactic, as 
Mr. Karrenberg noted; we're here legitimately seeking 
damages. 
We needed documents; we now have those documents. 
We got them, like I said, in November. We also — part of 
our — our motion for extension of time was based on the fact 
that we need to depose some of our former employees who are 
working for defendants and who are represented by 
defendants, pursuant to a letter from Mr. Wilcox that they 
are representing some of those individuals. 
We didn't get those addresses until August 20th, 
several months after discovery had — fact discovery had 
completed. We needed those addresses to depose these people 
and we were denied access to them. We need to do that. And 
that was part of our — the reason for our motion to amend 
the scheduling order. 
Your Honor, we'd ask that the scheduling order be 
amended to allow the completion of fact discovery simply for 
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the purpose of deposing these individuals — and they're 
listed in Mr. Wilcox's letter. I think that's all that's 
left on the fact discovery. And then an additional amount 
of time - 3 0 days after that, in order to complete and get 
our expert reports to the — to the defendants, and let them 
then file their rebuttal reports. 
THE COURT: Have you retained an expert? 
MR. MANSFIELD: We have, Judge. And they're 
working. But we need some final information, Judge. We got 
it, we're working on it, but we need these depositions. 
We'd like to get this case to trial as well, 
Judge. This has gone on a long time. It has been a hard-
fought case — looked like you were going to say something, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: I'm thinking. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Okay. It's been a hard-fought 
case, Judge. We think, out of fairness and substantial 
justice, defendants should not be permitted to deny us 
access to legitimate information as requested, this Court 
ordered them to produce, that they very tardily produced, 
and then step forward and say, "Well, sorry, you're too 
late. You can't — you didn't file your expert report, so 
summary judgment should be granted in our favor." It just 
violates all notions of fair play and substantial justice, 
Judge. And we'd ask that their motion for summary judgment 
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be denied and that a new scheduling order be put in place so 
that each party has a full and fair opportunity to present 
their respective cases and so we can get this case to trial, 
Judge. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Your Honor/ let me address in 
order, I think, the arguments that I heard. 
First one was that it's a typical practice to not 
make some calculation of Rule 26 damage. Judge, I happen to 
have been on the Rules of Civil Procedure committee when we 
rewrote all those rules, which means it makes people mad at 
me. And I happened to be on the subcommittee that actually 
rewrote it. We did the actual work. And the idea was, if 
you're going to file a lawsuit, you do a calculation of 
damages. And I will tell you this, Your Honor, it is not 
typical in my firm that we do not. We hire experts, if need 
be, before to get a preliminary damage analysis, or we get 
it from our clients, or we do it ourselves. It is not 
typical and it is contrary to what exactly was intended by 
the rules. We don't do it. 
Now, he said the motion was denied when we moved 
to amend that. We also made a motion to compel. And Judge 
Roth did deny our motion to — to have them amend their 
disclosures. But he granted our motion to compel and told 
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them to give us their documents on damages. 
This is what we received. Two sheets on starts 
and the general ledger. We have that from a motion to 
compel. 
The lead list they say they donft have, they have 
it, Your Honor. It is there. And they said they had to 
make a motion to compel, but Counsel misrepresents what the 
motion is. And if you'd like, Your Honor, I'll bring you 
the minute entry. 
THE COURT: When did they get the lead list? They 
actually didn't get it till February — or November? 
MR. KARRENBERG: When did they get it, 
Ms. Eshelman? 
Well, Judge, we gave it in response to this 
motion, and here's — I have this minute entry, Your Honor, 
where you may want to follow along. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I was looking for my minute 
entry. Is this the one in July? 
MR. KARRENBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I was just looking for 
that. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, that is the one from July 
of 2007. And, as the Court noted in the motion to compel, 
it said in the — well, on page 2: 
"Plaintiff is seeking access to defendant's 
18 
1 database for the purpose of assessing 
2 modifications that may have been made to 
3 defendants' lead list." 
4 The second paragraph readsf: 
5 "Defendants correctly observed that these requests 
6 did not specifically seek the production of the 
7 entity — of Eagle Gate and Provo College's 
8 database. Since the plaintiff did not request a 
9 database in discovery, the Court cannot compel." 
10 And if you look at the page — the first full 
11 paragraph on page 3: 
12 "Accordingly, the Court denies the plaintiff's 
13 motion to compel but directs the defendants to 
14 supplement the information they had already 
15 provided in a manner that addresses plaintiff's 
16 concern as outlined in its reply memorandum." 
17 They have that, Judge. 
18 Do you know exactly when you gave them that Excel 
19 spreadsheet? 
20 MS. ESHELMAN: Well, the second one was when we 
21 produced another one in June of 2007, and I'm trying to find 
22 the date of when I produced the initial disk. And I'll 
23 determine that — 
24 MR. KARRENBERG: They had that, Your Honor. Okay. 
25 Now, Judge, Counsel also says they're just getting 
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information. What Counsel didn't tell you is, during the 
holiday season, Christmastime, parents in town, we get a 
request to supplement and give them the last two years of 
the financials. Ms. Eshelman and I go check and see if 
they've even asked for those. They haven't. And, Judge, 
got no problem with it, look at it and say, you know, 
"Rather than get into a fight, even though I don't think 
they're entitled to it because they haven't asked for it in 
discovery, just give it to them." So we're getting it. 
You want to talk about the no good deed shall be 
unpunished, you know, I don't want to get in a fight and it 
gets thrown back at me. I guess I should learn my lesson. 
But it wasn't asked for and we only asked for it, got it 
during Christmastime. If they want supplements that they 
think they didn't have, where have they been since the 
discovery cutoff? 
Well, we're going to give them those financial 
statements. There's no problem with doing it. Okay. 
Now, the motion to extend, Judge, here's what's 
interesting. For experts, I just read you Mr. Barney's. 
What is the — why do you need an expert and information from 
us for their decline in enrollment? Either they know or 
they don't know it. And they knew it from day one. Why do 
they need anything from us, no matter what, to tell me 
what's their cost of hiring new people? You know. Judge, 
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this is illogical. Spock would be turning over in his 
grave. You know, his ears would be pointed downward. 
Why do they need for me to tell them what's their 
costs of rebuilding their admissions department? That's 
illogical. It makes no sense. 
And, Judge, even more importantly, while you 
probably haven!t looked at it, you'll see what we briefed 
when they file their motion to extend the discovery, expert 
report. In March of f07, they filed a motion to extend the 
discovery period. They said they needed a couple of things. 
Two things only. Jana Miller's hard drive and an out-of-
state deposition of Todd Knecht. That was the only reason, 
in March of '07, the only other discovery they claim they 
needed to extend the discovery cutoff. And you granted it 
to them for those two reasons. 
Now, afterwards, they want more? They didn't know 
about this in March of '07, when these deadlines are 
approaching for June to have the discovery cutoff and for 
having experts? Judge, this is all looking for excuses 
after the fact. 
Now, even these additional witnesses, these are 
people that used to work for them. Did anybody notice up 
their depositions? No. No. Even if they didn't have the 
addresses, some of these were working for us. Notice them 
up, send me a letter saying, "Are you going to produce them? 
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If not, I'll submit them." Addresses? They used to work 
for them. 
And you want to know where* Mr. Wilcox got the 
affidavits? You can look in the memos. He went to the 
phone book. And I think four or five of the six are 
correct, Judge. That's where he got the names and addresses 
for these people. And the other one was somebody that we 
knew had even applied for a job there, and we assumed they 
had the addresses. 
These are all pretextual. There's no reason that 
this couldn't have been done. And, clearly, they don't need 
any — they didn't need any expert information to finish up 
on these categories of documents that Mr. — damages that 
Mr. Barney did. 
Judge, I don't — I have no idea if this has been 
caused by... Mr. Wilcox just points out to me a letter from 
Mr. Lilja that we had a letter on April 19th, 2007 saying 
that — that we had provided electronic version of the data. 
So they've had this data for some time. Okay? 
Judge, where's the Rule 56(f) motion? I don't 
know why this didn't get done, if the client doesn't want to 
get it done or something else wasn't tracked. But why, when 
we're into the fourth year of litigation and we have 
complied with the rules, we've compLied with the Court's 
orders, why should my client have to suffer? Why should we 
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1 be dragging this out? 
2 Having a $10 million claim over a business in this 
3 community is a large claim. Judge, it's motion time, 
4 there's been no evidence stating what the damages are. 
5 Every claim requires proof of damages; they don't have any. 
6 We think the motion should be granted. 
7 Thank you, Your Honor. 
8 MR. MANSFIELD: Judge, may I very briefly address 
9 the letter from Mr. Lilja that he just raised regarding the 
10 documents? That letter was sent in April saying we got the 
11 database. But what it also — and subsequent to that, we 
12 couldn't access it. That's why they produced more of this 
13 information in June. We still couldn't get into it. That's 
14 why we filed our motion to compel; Your Honor ordered they'd 
15 be given — substantial additional information be given, and 
16 that was provided in November, as I mentioned earlier, 
17 Judge. 
18 MR. KARRENBERG: Gee, Judge, they can't get into 
19 it? Let me read you the second paragraph of this letter. 
20 "In our review of the documents produced, there's 
21 a discrepancy between the hard copies of documents 
22 and the electronic data provided." 
23 Now, how do you know that if you don't get into 
24 it? I mean... 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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MR. KARREMBERG: Thank you, sir. 
MR. LILJA: Your Honor, as the person who wrote 
the letter, could I just say what the point of that letter 
was? The information they have provided us on that 
electronic version was incomplete. We asked for a complete 
version. 
They produced another version in June of 2007. 
That was also incomplete. They would not give us the 
information until we filed a motion. Your Honor ordered 
them to produce the additional data, which they produced to 
us finally, which appears to be complete, based on both the 
hard copy version and now the electronic version. 
So that's where we are. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Give me just a few 
moments, I'll be (inaudible). 
MR. KARRENBERG: Yes, sir. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Judge. 
(Pause in proceedings, 10:38 to 10:53 a.m.) 
THE COURT: A couple of questions. And we're 
trying to get some clarification, if I can. The first 
question I wanted to make sure that I understood is that, 
you're indicating that the requests for extending the dates 
in the scheduling order was in fact never ruled on. Is 
that -
MR. MANSFIELD: That's correct, Judge. That was 
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filed, submitted for decision in July and it's never been 
ruled on. 
THE COURT: Do you have any information to the 
contrary on that, Mr. Karrenberg? 
MR. KARRENBERG: No, sir. No, sir. That - I 
mean, I don't think it was submitted for decision in July. 
I think it was filed in July. 
MR. MANSFIELD: It was. July 3 0th or 31st. 
THE COURT: All right. And I think we're trying 
to find some of that. And then you indicated you're asking 
for all the additional deadlines to be extended 60 days, 
right? 
MR. MANSFIELD: Well -
THE COURT: And so -
MR. MANSFIELD: — obviously, we're way beyond that 
now, Judge. 
THE COURT: And that was my point. If we're 
looking at the 60 days — and, essentially, we've had six 
months — in a way, we've kind of had a de facto six-month 
extension, in a way. 
MR. MANSFIELD: In a way. But we've been waiting 
for a lot of these documents that we just got, we believe, 
the first week in November, Judge. 
THE COURT: That's my next question. Can you tell 
me what is different about the documents that you received 
25 
in November that are different from the information that you 
had received earlier in the spring — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah. As Mr. Lilja explained, 
the — what we received in April and then in June were 
incomplete versions of what we received in November. 
November was the complete document that was — was viewable. 
We then had what we needed, complete information in 
November. It was substantially incomplete prior to that, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. What about the nature of the 
content of the information? Do we have any difference in 
the nature of the content that — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Well -
THE COURT: - that would prohibit you from 
starting to talk with an expert in regards to the type of 
information to be able to form — relate an opinion? 
MR. MANSFIELD: Certainly, Judge. I mean, the 
nature wasn't really different in the sense of what it was. 
I mean, there was lead lists and information regarding 
changes to lead lists, and that was incomplete. 
What we're — one of our big claims here, Judge, is 
drop in enrollment, which we're claiming is the result of 
the defendants' tortious acts. I mean, we have — that's 
their trade secrets claim, we have the intentional 
interference claim, we have the contract claim. A 
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1 significant amount of that has to do with what was their 
2 enrollment — their lead list. Our claim is they stole our 
3 lead list, if you remember, by hacking — our former 
4 employees hack — who were then employees of the defendants, 
5 broke into our system, hacked into our system, stole this 
6 information, downloaded it and used it. We needed to make 
7 that comparison of their lead list to our lead list to see 
8 what it showed to help pin down our causation for damages. 
9 And until we have that causation, we can't really do our 
10 damage calculation. I mean, our experts have been working, 
11 but they've been stalled because, if they do the work, you 
12 know, one way without that information and it bears out 
13 different information, you know, the work is going to have 
14 to be completely redone because it changes the entire nature 
15 of the claim. 
16 MR. WILCOX: Your Honor, can I respond to a couple 
17 of things? The access to the database question, there is no 
18 allegation there's been any access to the database that 
19 would result in any information being taken from the 
20 database since, I believe, May of 2004, which was before 
21 this — before this lawsuit was commenced. There's no 
22 evidence of any access after that date, there's no 
23 allegation of any access. So we're talking about lead lists 
24 that would have existed before 2004. That information was 
25 given to them beforehand. 
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What was given in November — in November of last 
year was a supplementation of it to carry it through — as I 
understand it, through the date — supplement, you know, 
carrying it forward. But you're taLking - their allegation 
is that we accessed lead lists that existed before May of 
2004 not after May of 2004. 
THE COURT: But the nature of the information is 
the same, it just may have covered two different time 
periods, is what you're indicating? 
MR. WILCOX: Your Honor, what you're talking 
about, you're talking about names. They're saying that we 
have names on our list that would be on their list and, 
therefore, the allegation is the only way they could get on 
our list is if we — if we somehow accessed the computer and 
stole that information or obtained it in some other type of 
nefarious or — or tortious manner. 
The names on the list, however, they've already 
been able to search that. They've gone through and 
identified already, I think it's 5,000 names, Rob, that you 
say — that appear on your list and eippear on our list? 
MR. LILJA: It's more than that based on the 
November list. 
MR. WILCOX: Okay. More than 5,000 names. But -
MR. LILJA: But that's the -
MR. MANSFIELD: Okay, hold on a minute. 
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MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, let me point out one 
thing. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Wait. I'm being double-teamed 
here, Judge. This is a little unfair. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Well, sir, wait. You've asked 
Mr. Lilja to get up, sir. 
Let me point out one thing. 
THE COURT: How - hold on. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Just one comment. 
THE COURT: No. No. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Yes, sir. I understand no. It's 
not a hard word. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Judge -
THE COURT: Let me direct the traffic, if we 
might, since I'm the one asking the questions. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Like I sai£, it's not a hard 
word, Your Honor. 
MR. MANSFIELD: No, it's not. Judge -
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THE COURT: One at a time. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Certainly. Substantial additional 
information, including additional columns of information was 
added to what we got in November. One of the issues — 
THE COURT: Okay. Try and give me detail of 
substantive nature of information. What I'm trying to weigh 
in my mind — and I understand it was supplemental 
information, but was it of a completely different distinct 
type and nature — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. 
THE COURT: - or was it of a type that was just 
additional to and of the same type that you!d already 
received before? 
Because here's why I'm struggling. If you had the 
information before and this was merely to complete the 
information, to supplement it, why couldn't an expert have 
been starting to have been used and running the calculations 
based upon the information that you did have? And if you 
would have additional people, granted you would have 
additional numbers that you could add in to the 
calculations, because now you have this supplemental. Just 
like revising your medical bills. You've been in the 
hospital longer than what you had before, you add the dollar 
figures and top it. 
I don't — you know, we're not seeing anything that 
30 
1 happened with that initial information that was provided 
2 to -
3 MR. MANSFIELD: It's a little more sophisticated 
4 than that, Judge. First of all, there was additional 
5 information. One of the claims we have, obviously, is you 
6 have a great deal of duplication on the names. Part of 
7 our — our assertion, you know, there's going to be a certain 
8 amount of duplication because you're going to have, you 
9 know, some students are going to be applying and submitting 
10 inquiries to all of these similar types of schools. We 
11 think the incidence of duplication is much, much greater 
12 than what that would — what would be found ordinarily. 
13 That, we could not determine until we got the complete list. 
14 Also, additional information was added and — 
15 THE COURT: Such as what type? 
16 MR. MANSFIELD: In the sense of who - who added? 
17 Who made the changes to the lead list? Because, that's very 
18 important in determining causation, Judge. Because if it's 
19 one of our former employees that we can tie it to, that's 
20 going to — that's going to directly impact our causation 
21 argument. 
22 THE COURT: They just want to know who had the 
23 finger in the pie. 
24 MR. KARRENBERG: They have a lot of the - what 
25 Stevens Henager called admissions consultants. And I don't 
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know what Eagle Gate calls them. Who had their finger in 
the pie is very critical, Judge. 
THE COURT: Now, I have - as long as you're there, 
my other questions and concern, Mr. Karrenberg seems to be 
very persuasive with respect to the three issues on damages. 
That type of information really would have been in your hand 
all the way along and the information that they would have 
provided you on that is really nothing that they have or 
should have given you. Now they1re going back with you on 
this, such as decline in the enrollment numbers. 
Do you agree that nothing they could have given to 
you helps you make a calculation for enrollment numbers or 
past number on one date, X number on another date? 
MR. MANSFIELD: Okay. Yes, thatfs correct in one 
sense, Judge. There's no doubt we know what our numbers 
are. On "X date, they're this number; on "Y date, they're a 
different number. No doubt. 
But what it comes down to, Judge, is causation. 
What is the reason those numbers decline from "X date to "Y 
date? Their argument is going to be it's simple market 
forces and — and it's not our fault. What we're — what 
our — our theory — 
THE COURT: How do you prove your theory -
MR. MANSFIELD: Yeah. Our theory -
THE COURT: — with that information you say you 
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needed and didn't get until November^? 
MR. MANSFIELD: Our theory of the case, Judge, is 
the reason our enrollment numbers dropped is because our 
admissions consultants were hired away by Eagle Gate 
College, they then improperly gained access to our 
confidential database of lead lists, they downloaded those 
names, they used those names to our disadvantage to recruit, 
that they changed information in our lead list, they — you 
know, they used them for their own purposes. 
We need to know, one, what their lead list was, 
what it looked like, so we can do the comparison to make 
that causation determination and also, then, determine who 
made those changes. And thatf s integral in proving our — 
our damage figures with drop of enrollment. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you say, if I 
understood correctly from co-counsel, that you had 
approximately 5,000 names or leads. 
MR. MANSFIELD: At one -
THE COURT: And at — in the spring of this year. 
MR. MANSFIELD: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And then there was some supplemental 
information given in November — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Some in June and then also some in 
November. 
THE COURT: - that - that changed that. Do we 
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know how much those numbers changed by? Hundreds? Dozens? 
Thousands? I mean, what are we really talking about? 
MR. MANSFIELD: My understanding, Judge -
MR. LILJA: About 3,000 additional. The critical 
point is (inaudible). Before, we had no idea who put those 
5,000 names on there; now we do. That's the — that's the 
information we're going to (inaudible). 
THE COURT: You do know who -
MR. LILJA: And that — there's an additional 
problem — 
THE COURT: — for the ones prior to March or — 
MR. MANSFIELD: No. From November. From the 
November information, we now know. We've found that out. 
MR. LILJA: That's the additional column that they 
added was — would add it. 
THE COURT: You recognize, then, you've — 
MR. MANSFIELD: I know. 
THE COURT: - double tag teamed these guys. 
MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. 
THE COURT: So it works out even. 
MR. MANSFIELD: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. What about the response to 
the other information — 
MR. MANSFIELD: Now, such as information about 
what it cost to retrain — 
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1 THE COURT: There you go. 
2 MR, MANSFIELD: — an admissions consultant, I 
3 agree, Judge, that that information's within our control. 
4 But the substantial portion of our damages deal with the 
5 decline in enrollment and the damages that flow from there. 
6 I mean, thatfs the substantial element of damages in this 
7 case, Judge. Not the value to reach — you know, the cost to 
8 retrain the admissions consultant, you know, and marketing 
9 costs. Those — 
10 THE COURT: Okay. And my — don't we have an 
11 expert on that? And those figures being calculated, then, 
12 in order to determine (inaudible). 
13 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, Judge, I think that's part 
14 and parcel of our entire damage numbers and our expert 
15 report, and rather than piecemeal it, we wanted to give a 
16 complete and accurate damage calculation so it wouldn't be 
17 used against us at a later date, you know, at the time of 
18 trial, jury trial, saying, "Well, at one point, we said 
19 it's — you know, they came back and said it's this. And 
20 then we later supplemented and added to it, Judge. I think 
21 it's better to have a complete final report, provided it 
22 gives an accurate assessment of what our damages are rather 
23 than do it piecemeal. And we've timely — we moved prior to 
24 the cutoff date to amend and to continue the — the date 
25 for — for disclosing expert reports, you know, two days 
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1 prior to the due date, but we did timely move for that, 
2 asking Your Honor to — to change those dates. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Karrenberg. 
6 MR. KARRENBERG: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: It's now yes. 
8 MR. KARRENBERG: And I never said yes as well. 
9 First of all, Your Honor, the fact that there's a 
10 lot of names on this list, I got to tell you, the only thing 
11 that surprised me is the names are 99 percent the same. 
12 These people are marketing to the same group, using the same 
13 advertising in this community. They get lead lists from 
14 high schools — not hard to get. The — if you pick up City 
15 Weekly, you'll see their ads on the same page next to each 
16 other. The TV are at the same time late at night. In fact, 
17 unless these students are really silly, they should be 
18 calling not only these two schools but every school just to 
19 find out. 
20 So the fact that names are the same are going to 
21 be there. Okay? So, Judge, the information they have 
22 received additionally had just been updated information. 
23 There's been no new information. 
24 THE COURT: Articulate for me what percentage that 
25 additional - if any information was given in November - this 
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is of what had been given in June and before. 
MR. KARRENBERG: We added one column showing who 
was the admissions representative. But they can't put the 
information into the computer. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Because they do not change or put 
the information in. The affidavit of Rachel Johnson tells 
you who puts the information in. 
But, Judge, one other thing: Causation is a fact 
question. 
THE COURT: Let's make sure I'm on the same page. 
So what they've indicated is that they now have a name or an 
admissions persons associated with the enrollment people. 
What you're saying, really, is nothing of substance because 
they weren't the ones that had anything to do with it at all 
anyway. 
MR. KARRENBERG: In entering it. 
THE COURT: So they add the additional names, but 
it doesn't cause — cause a connection that they're thinking 
it's going to do that. Is that what you're telling me? 
MR. KARRENBERG: Exactly, Your Honor. But even 
more importantly, discovery was cut off before they made 
this motion. Causation is a fact question, it is not an 
expert question. And, you know, Judge, if you want me to 
walk back to my office, I'll come back with the cases across 
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the board. 
THE COURT: No. I don't have 
I The question is, though, whether or not 
sufficient factual information to allow 
a problem with it. 
you have provided 
them to perform 
those calculations. Which I hear the argument on their 
side, and they're saying they weren't able to attempt to do 
that until November. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Well, Judge, one, I disagree with 
that. Okay? Two is, even the motion to compel that they 
said you granted says it's not granted because they didn't 
ask for this information. They didn't ask for this 
information, and you asked us to just supplement any 
additional information. 
In March, when we're alreaidy facing a cutoff date, 
they're asking for extensions, and for two reasons. You 
know, this is — what's the name of that kids' story, The 
Neverending Story? I mean, you know, what, are we back here 
next week on another one? These names of these people they 
wanted addresses to to depose, they have nothing to do with 
damages. 
THE COURT: Yeah. No. I'm not so concerned as 
much about those as I am in trying to get an understanding, 
really, of the additional information or supplemental 
information — 
MR. KARRENBERG: But, Judge -
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1 THE COURT: — from November to the current time. 
2 MR. KARRENBERG: If they needed additional 
3 information, other than supplemental information, where were 
4 they getting it in the first place? They didn't ask for a 
5 lead list. They didn't ask for our entire database. They 
6 asked for a lead list, and they got it. 
7 You know, Judge, I don't have to do their job. 
8 That's what they asked for, that's what they got, that's why 
9 you denied the motion. And you said, "See if you can get 
10 together and supplement with them to see what they need." 
11 So we do it, Judge. Your Honor, this is three-
12 plus years into the litigation. By this time, they've had 
13 this information; at the last minute, they're going to come 
14 in and say, "Oh, we didn't ask correctly and, Judge, can you 
15 help us out?" And so we do. I mean — and these — and the 
16 declining enrollment? They either knew it or they didn't 
17 know it. The other items, they either knew it or they 
18 didn't know it. 
19 In causation, it's not their experts. No expert's 
20 going to get up there and say, "You caused these damages." 
21 They're just going to say, "Based on this causation that 
22 they proved" or didn't prove, whatever, "I calculate the 
23 damages to be that." But that's a factual determination. 
24 So there is no reason not to have the expert 
25 report. If it's their decline in enrollment, well, if they 
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1 I think it's because of something that we did, you know, they 
2 need to get that proved, but their experts are going to come 
3 up with the numbers long before we are. 
4 Thank you, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Even though it's your motion, I'm 
6 going to give him a brief opportunity to respond, if you 
7 don!t mind. 
8 MR. MANSFIELD: One last bit, Judge. 
9 As Mr. Karrenberg pointed out, these schools 
10 advertise in some of the — in some of the same publications. 
11 They also have different publications. They go to high 
12 schools, they try and seek some of the same population of 
13 students. And there's obviously going to be some crossover 
14 and some natural duplication between them. 
15 And that's why this other column was so critical, 
16 Judge, because it helps prove our causation. Without 
17 causation, we can't get the damages. Now, Mr. Karrenberg 
18 gave a good example of his closing argument, saying it's not 
19 important and it's irrelevant. These are factual decisions 
20 for the jury, Judge. That's what he's trying to argue to 
21 you now. We think they're important, he thinks they're — 
22 they aren't important. That's the argument he should be 
23 making, Judge. But we feel they are and we feel they're 
24 necessary. We have an obligation. It's our burden to prove 
25 causation. This is needed. We can't get to our damage 
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1 until we can sufficiently get our arms around the causation. 
2 We now have what we need. We didn't get it until 
3 November. We'd ask for a brief period of time to complete 
4 the depositions that we requested an<3 then expert reports. 
5 THE COURT: Help me understand - before I let you 
6 go, help me understand, with this additional name in this 
7 single category that was additionally provided, the names of 
8 (inaudible). 
9 MR. MANSFIELD: They're what they call - what we 
10 call admissions consultants. And I don't know their title. 
11 MR. KARRENBERG: Your Honor, if I may have leave, 
12 we have with us one of the officers of the company here, who 
13 could explain it exactly. Would you like to hear from him? 
14 THE COURT: What I'm trying to figure out is 
15 whether or not the names that — they're saying that they now 
16 have what they need, and I'm trying to figure out — 
17 MR. KARRENBERG: Well, Judge, I -
18 THE COURT: - if that - no. If the information or 
19 if that name is going to allow them to try to make this 
20 causation claim that they're saying they can make. But 
21 you're telling me no because they're not allowed to do 
22 anything with the computer (inaudibld). 
23 MR. KARRENBERG: That's my understanding, Your 
24 Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Give me an understanding of who -
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1 MR. KARRENBERG: We can have it from the horse's 
2 mouth rather than from me on what it is. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, Your Honor, I'm going to 
5 object to this. I mean, we don't have anyone here to rebut 
6 this. I mean, it's — 
7 THE COURT: Well, here's the problem. You're 
8 saying, "I was not given information. I asked for it, I was 
9 delayed. I didn't get it till November. I don't have 
10 anything I can do with any experts, and now I've finally 
11 gotten my information." You know, that's pretty generic. I 
12 want to see what information you were given additionally, 
13 besides quantity, 5,000 to 8,000 -
14 MR. MANSFIELD: That's the duplication, not just 
15 the total names. That's the duplication, Judge. That's 
16 just a duplication. 
17 THE COURT: All right. And so now I'm trying to 
18 figure out, well, is this supplemental information or are we 
19 providing new information? Now, new because they're new 
20 names. But is it really new or is it just another category 
21 that is worthless? 
22 MR. MANSFIELD: It's new because of that 
23 additional category of who added it. 
24 THE COURT: That's what I want - that's your 
25 representation of what it is. So, please, tell me what — 
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1 tell me what this is. 
2 MR. SHELLY: I'm Brian Shelly. I'm vice 
3 president, growth and development of Eagle Gate and Provo 
4 College. And this additional column is just we've — they 
5 call them admission consultants, we call them admission 
6 reps. The additional column is just who was assigned the 
7 lead for that. So if we have Student A, it's assigned to 
8 admission Rack A. We have Student B, they're assigned to — 
9 you know, admission Rack B. 
10 So the additional column is just who the 
11 representative is who's going to work that lead to enroll 
12 them to school. 
13 THE COURT: And so it's the information that 
14 they've — if you know — received prior, in June and in March 
15 and previously to this time period, did have those 
16 connections of who the admission person was? 
17 MR. KARRENBERG: No, sir. But there is - thank 
18 you, Brian. 
19 Here's one thing we ought to make sure. As Brian 
20 just said to you, it's who'll decide. It doesn't say who 
21 got the lead. Okay? It's not there. 
22 THE COURT: It doesn't say who contacted the 
23 person? 
24 MR. KARRENBERG: How the lead came in, it doesn't 
25 say that. So there's no information there that's going to 
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1 be of any assistance to this so-called problem, in fact. In 
2 other words, if you called up and said to Eagle Gate, "I 
3 want to take a class," you call the front desk. They1re 
4 going to enter you into the lead list; that I know, and one 
5 of the few people who can. And then the column just says 
6 who that person is assigned to. It doesn't — when they -
7 you get that additional column, it doesn't do it. And if 
8 there's any additional names that are added, they already 
9 had everything through June of 2007 the last time we updated 
10 it and before we had everything up to the same date. 
11 THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm hearing them 
12 saying, no, they didn't. 
13 MR. KARRENBERG: Well, Judge, that's not true, and 
14 we got affidavits saying it. They had them the first time, 
15 then in June, we gave more information which had up through 
16 June. That's when we — we fixed it so that they could 
17 manipulate it. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. KARRENBERG: Thank you. 
20 MR. MANSFIELD: Okay. Well, then, I'm hearing 
2\ something different now than what I've heard before. We 
22 were told, and what was represented to us — and so maybe we 
23 don't have the information we need -- is these are the reps 
24 who got these numbers and who added them. So maybe we don't 
25 have now what we need, Judge. It is our representation that 
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1 was what it was. 
2 MR. KARRENBERG: Wasn't told by us. It's contrary 
3 to the — 
4 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, that's what I asked for 
5 specifically, and that was what was given to us, as a 
6 representation that "this fulfills what we're required to 
7 give you." 
8 THE COURT: I'm going to take this one under 
9 advisement and give you a written decision. That way, we'll 
10 keep a paper record for benefit of all. 
11 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Judge. Appreciate it. 
12 MR. KARRENBERG: Thank you, sir. 
13 MR. WILCOX: Thank you, Judge. 
14 MR. LILJA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 (Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., 
16 the hearing was concluded|.) 
17 I -oooOooo-
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STEVENS HENAGER v. EAGLE GATE 
Tab I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040921860 
vs. : 
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, : 
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH, 
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ, 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER, 
• 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it the Plaintiff's Motion for Relief From or 
For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary Judgment. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
After considering the parties' respective positions, the Court 
determines that the Plaintiff's current Motion, with respect to the issue 
of damages, is simply an attempt to re-argue or bolster the arguments 
made in its original opposition. However, even considering these re-
arguments, the Court remains convinced that the Plaintiff had adequate 
information such that it could submit timely expert reports (even if on 
a preliminary basis) to substantiate damages. The Plaintiff's ability 
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to provide such a report shortly after the Court rendered its summary 
judgment decision (with no additional discovery) confirms this reality. 
The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff has not met the standard 
for excusable neglect. It was simple inaction and lack of diligence on 
the part of the Plaintiff that led to the Court's ultimate decision to 
grant summary judgment. The Court can find no legal or factual grounds 
to reconsider this decision. 
There is an issue, however, as to whether the Plaintiff's equitable 
claims were subject to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. It 
does not appear that the Plaintiff's equitable claims were part of the 
Defendants' initial Motion, which was geared primarily to the lack of 
evidence to substantiate the Plaintiff's damages claim. The Court agrees 
that it was improper for this aspect of the Plaintiff's claims to be 
dismissed in a summary fashion, when the issue of whether the Plaintiff 
is indeed entitled to injunctive relief has never been fully briefed. 
The Court concludes that those claims survive. To the extent that the 
Court's prior Order may be inconsistent with this, it should be modified 
to accurately reflect that the equitable claims were not subject to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In closing, the Court notes that the Defendants have raised legal 
arguments as to the viability of the Plaintiff's equitable claims. Such 
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arguments are more properly brought in the form of a dispositive motion, 
rather than an opposition to a Motion to Reconsider (particularly where 
those arguments were not made in the underlying Motion for Summary 
Judgment). The Court will not consider the substantive merits of those 
arguments in their current context. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider in part and denying it in 
part. 
Dated this _day of May, 2008. 
^ A ^ 
ROBERT P. FAUS1 
DISTRICT COURT JT 
90» 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BULLEN & WILSON, LLC, dba EAGLE 
GATE COLLEGE; CECELIA WILSON 
dba PROVO COLLEGE; MOSESE 
IONGI; TREVOR SMITH; WALLACE 
ROGERS; RICHARD HORWITZ; 
STEVEN TODD KNECHT; JANA 
MILLER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040921860 
Judge Faust 
Plaintiff Stevens-Henager College ("Stevens-Henager"), by and through its counsel of record, 
submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed its complaint and jury demand alleging breach of contract, 
violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, interference with prospective economic relations, violations 
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Interrogatories requesting damage calculations and supporting facts, and (d) has not identified or 
provided reports form any purported experts who Plaintiff has repeatedly claimed "would provide a 
calculation and analysis of the damages." 
RESPONSE: Disputed. Plaintiff produced documents supporting its damages. See 
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 16. Plaintiff has identified the basis for its damages and 
will supplement its Initial Disclosures and discovery responses as soon as Defendants provided the 
Court-ordered documents and in accordance with an amended scheduling order. See Second Mansfield 
Aff. at f^ 11. Carl Barney provided an estimate of Plaintiff s damages and the factual basis for 
computation of that estimate. Plaintiffs representatives have provided substantial factual evidence of 
Plaintiffs damages as shown by the following deposition testimony of Carol Gastiger, Vicki Dewsnup, 
and Carl Barney: 
Carol Gastiger: 
Q: I want you to tell me what facts you're aware of that would support an allegation Eagle 
Gate College or Provo College caused damage to Stevens-Henager. 
A, I think the loss of the Tongan population. I think the money we extended on it. I mean in 
very real dollars. And in very non-real dollars, in time and in effort. That are not in specific 
dollars. 
I believe that when you lose a very competent Admissions Consultant you lose 
production for a period of time. That results in - let's say that I replace Tecia and the other 
person starts five people a month. Tecia is averaging eight. That's a total of nine people in a 
given three-month period of time, if this other person ever gets as good as Tecia. 
22 
633 370534v1 
7A 
You multiply that time tuition. That's money - real money, in my opinion, that's been 
lost. Those are real dollars, I think. 
Dep. of Carol Gastiger at 105:2 - 20, relevant portions attached hereto as Exhibit N. 
Vicki Dewsnup 
Q: Can you tell me what it is that you claim to be the "tremendous damage" that has been 
caused? 
A: There's extensive costs incurred in advertising and marketing. We continue to use any 
leads that come into the college from time to time, and with the loss of adequate phone numbers 
due to admissions by Mr. Rogers, it became difficult, if not impossible, to use our own leads. 
Q: Has there been any additional damage that you would characterize as "tremendous 
damage" as you did in your affidavit, Exhibit 84, since the time of your affidavit in October of 
2004, or your deposition in January of 2005? 
A: I currently have not been able to compare the lists of leads between Stevens-
Henager and Eagle Gate or Provo College.1 
Q: As I understand it, the damage that you claim to be "tremendous' in your affidavit 
of October 2004, and in your deposition in January of 2005, is an economic damage, is it 
not? 
1
 Defendants' list of potential students and financial documents were produced pursuant to the 
designated of attorney's eyes only, which precludes Plaintiffs employees from reviewing them or 
comparing them in any way to Plaintiffs financial documents or Lead List, further preventing Plaintiff 
from calculating the damages incurred. 
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A: There was economic damage, certainly, and also damage to morale at the 
campuses affected. 
Q: Any other damages that you would constitute or you would consider to be 
"tremendous damage" as referred to in your affidavit and your deposition testimony? 
A: There was loss of employees. 
Dep. of Stevens-Henager College (Vicki Dewnsup) at 8:17 - 9:21, relevant portions attached hereto as 
Exhibit O. 
Carl Barney 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what the damages are suffered by Stevens-Henager 
as a result of the alleged conduct of the defendants in this case? 
A: Many million of dollars. 
Q: When did you form that opinion? 
A: At the time that all of this was revealed, the bad acts of Eagle Gate and Provo 
College were revealed to me, and connecting with the loss of the starts, that's when I 
formed that opinion. 
Q: Many millions of dollars? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Are we talking more than $ 10 million? 
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A: It could be. 
Q: In forming that opinion, what factors or facts did you consider? 
A: The damage to at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden. 
Q: In damage, you mean the decline in the number of starts? 
A: The decline of starts. The decline of the morale. The struggle. The losses. The 
economic losses. The effort. The cost of rebuilding. 
Q: What were the economic losses? 
A: The loss of starts, which then would result into an income stream over three or 
four years. The cost of hiring and training new people. The efforts to rebuild the 
admissions department. Where we would be today had this not - this impact not 
occurred. 
Dep. of Carl Barney at 143:12-144:24. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court must view the 
disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
its favor. Summary judgment is not appropriate when, as here, a reasonable jury could find for the 
plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 248,106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). 
The testimony of Carl Barney established Plaintiffs good faith estimate of damages and the 
factual basis for that estimate. All reasonable inferences regarding Mr. Barney's estimate must be 
drawn in favor of Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff has established the factual basis for its damages 
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